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Social Security Reform and National
Saving in an Era of Budget Surpluses
THE UNEXPECTED EMERGENCE of federal budget surpluses during the late
1990s, combined with official projections that these surpluses will con-
tinue for decades to come, has significantly altered fiscal policymaking.
Congressional and administration budget proposals now aim to balance the
budget exclusive of Social Security, or exclusive of Social Security and
Medicare, rather than on an overall, or uniﬁed, basis. Some proposals state
the goal of paying off the entire stock of federal debt held by the public
within a decade and a half. This fiscal bounty has also altered the likely
avenues for Social Security and Medicare reform. Traditional options
for ensuring the programs’ financial stability—benefit cuts and tax
increases—have largely given way to new options focused on using the
expected surpluses to prefund future obligations.
The future obligations of Social Security and Medicare under current
law are large. The projected aging of the population and rising health care
spending imply that federal outlays on these programs will nearly double
as a share of GDP over the next seventy-five years, from 6.3 percent in
1
DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF
Department of the Treasury
JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN
Harvard University 
We formed our understanding of the issues discussed in this paper through innumerable
conversations with David Wilcox, Stephen Goss, and other members of the Clinton admin-
istration’s Social Security reform technical working group. We are grateful for comments
from Alan Auerbach, Martin Feldstein, William Gale, James Hines, James Horney, Peter
Orszag, James Poterba, Matthew Shapiro, David Skilling, Steve Zeldes, and other partici-
pants in the Brookings Panel conference, the Harvard Macroeconomics Seminar, and the
National Bureau of Economic Research’s Summer Institute Social Security Working Group.
The views expressed are entirely our own and not necessarily those of the Treasury Depart-
ment or any other government agency. Jeffrey Liebman is grateful to the National Instutute
on Aging for ﬁnancial support.
9760-03  BPEA Elmendorf  12/21/2000 14:16  Page 12000 to 12.2 percent in 2075.
1 Increased federal spending on Medicaid,
which pays for long-term care for low-income seniors, will accentuate this
jump. From the perspective of the programs, prefunding these obligations
requires a buildup of assets that can be redeemed to pay future benefits.
From the perspective of the nation, however, such programmatic prefund-
ing does not necessarily imply that the obligations have been prefunded
in an economically meaningful sense. For example, Congress could sim-
ply legislate that $3 trillion of additional government bonds be placed in
the Social Security trust fund immediately. This action would nearly elim-
inate Social Security’s seventy-ﬁve-year actuarial imbalance but would, by
itself, have no direct economic effects.
Economic prefunding of Social Security and Medicare requires incre-
mental national saving, which is the only way to increase future resources.
In this paper we estimate the effect on national saving of a range of Social
Security reform plans designed to capture and contrast the main features of
existing proposals. The plans we examine specify the income and outlays
of—and thus saving within—the Social Security trust fund and any new
individual retirement saving accounts that the plans would create. Yet
national saving also includes the saving of the non–Social Security part
of the federal budget and the non–individual accounts part of the private
sector. Hence the overall impact of Social Security reform depends cru-
cially on the response of these other sectors. Our analysis focuses on these
responses. We mostly leave aside other critical issues for Social Security
reform such as the distribution of benefits, the allocation of risk, and
administrative costs, important though these are.
We begin by reviewing the dramatic recent improvement in the federal
budget and then discuss the appropriate roles of national saving and pro-
grammatic prefunding in response to population aging. Next we explore
the relationship of Social Security to the rest of the federal budget, with
an emphasis on alternative characterizations of the political economy of
budget policy. Then we present our methodology for estimating the effect
of Social Security reform on national saving and apply this methodology
to a representative set of reform proposals.
Our analysis yields four primary conclusions about the effect of Social
Security reform on national saving. First, budget policy matters: some
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
1. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (2000a).
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budget excluding Social Security but have no effect on saving if the polit-
ical process tends to balance the unified budget. In contrast, other ele-
ments raise saving only if the political process tends to balance the uni-
fied budget. Second, dissimilar plans can have similar effects on capital
accumulation, in part because the plans pay out similar total retirement
beneﬁts (although often with a different division between traditional ben-
eﬁts and payouts from individual accounts) and in part because responses
elsewhere in the budget offset any differences. Third, if policymakers aim
to balance the budget excluding Social Security, then all reforms that gen-
erate programmatic prefunding—including benefit cuts, payroll tax
increases, individual accounts funded from general revenue, and transfers
to the Social Security trust fund—raise national saving by a corresponding
amount. However, in this case diverting Social Security payroll tax rev-
enue to individual accounts does not raise national saving. Fourth, if poli-
cymakers instead aim to balance the unified budget, then the only way that
reform can boost national saving is to move money out of the government
by funding individual accounts. 
The Emergence of Federal Budget Surpluses
Between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, persistent efforts to bal-
ance the federal budget were overwhelmed by large increases in health
spending and by the 1990–91 recession. The result was a unified deficit
in 1992 that was nearly as large relative to GDP as the deﬁcits of the mid-
1980s. Between 1992 and 2000, in contrast, the unified budget balance
improved by 7 percent of GDP, from a deficit of 4.7 percent of GDP to a
surplus of 2.4 percent.
2 Table 1 shows that this improvement consists of a
significant increase in revenue and a nearly equal decrease in noninterest
outlays, both as shares of GDP, together with the resulting impact on inter-
est payments. Debt held by the public fell to 35 percent of GDP in 2000,
down from 49 percent just four years ago.
This dramatic turnaround in the fiscal picture stems partly from leg-
islative actions and partly from favorable changes in economic conditions
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 3
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GDP in part because of tax increases legislated in 1993 but also, more
important, because of an increase in taxable income relative to GDP, an
increase in the share of income received by people in the highest tax brack-
ets, and a surge in capital gains from the booming stock market.4 In par-
ticular, individual income taxes rose from 8.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to
more than 10 percent in 2000, even though no significant tax increases
were enacted between those years. Noninterest spending declined as a
share of GDP in large part because defense spending was virtually
unchanged in nominal dollars and thus fell sharply relative to GDP, and
because entitlement spending dipped as a share of GDP. The most dra-
matic change in entitlement spending relative to the previous eight years
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
3. “Technical factors” is a residual category that captures changes in tax receipts and
expenditures that are due neither to policy nor to the state of the overall economy. Exam-
ples include the distribution of income and growth in the relative cost of medical care.
4. Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2000).





Fiscal income Defense Entitlement budget held  by
year taxes Total spending spendinga Total balance public
1986 7.9 17.5 6.2 10.2 19.4 –5.0 39.6
1987 8.4 18.4 6.1 10.0 18.6 –3.2 40.6
1988 8.0 18.1 5.8 9.8 18.2 –3.1 40.9
1989 8.2 18.3 5.6 9.8 18.1 –2.8 40.5
1990 8.1 18.0 5.2 10.5 18.6 –3.9 42.0
1991 7.9 17.8 5.4 10.7 19.0 –4.5 45.4
1992 7.7 17.5 4.9 11.0 19.0 –4.7 48.2
1993 7.8 17.6 4.5 10.8 18.5 –3.9 49.5
1994 7.8 18.1 4.1 10.8 18.1 –2.9 49.4
1995 8.1 18.5 3.7 10.7 17.5 –2.2 49.2
1996 8.5 18.9 3.5 10.7 17.2 –1.4 48.5
1997 9.0 19.3 3.3 10.5 16.6 –0.3 46.1
1998 9.6 19.9 3.1 10.5 16.3 0.8 43.1
1999 9.6 20.0 3.0 10.3 16.2 1.4 39.9
2000 10.2 20.6 3.0 10.2 15.9 2.4 34.7
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2001,
February 2000; U.S. Treasury Department, Monthly Treasury Statement, September 2000.
a. Total mandatory programmatic spending from Historical Tables.
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ing between 1984 and 1992 was followed by a percentage increase only
half that size between 1992 and 2000.
The future prospects for the federal budget have also improved dra-
matically in recent years, according to both the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The OMB
now projects that the uniﬁed budget surpluses between 2001 and 2010 will
total $4.2 trillion absent any changes in policy; the same agency projected
only $1.3 trillion in cumulative surpluses immediately following passage
of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act.
5 The long-run budget picture is also far
brighter, as ﬁgure 1 shows. In early 1993 the OMB projected that the uni-
fied budget deficit would exceed 10 percent of GDP by 2010 and worsen
rapidly thereafter; by early 2000 the agency was projecting budget sur-
pluses for the next half century.
6 The CBO summarizes its own long-run
projections in terms of an estimated “ﬁscal gap,” which is the immediate,
permanent tax increase or spending decrease needed to keep public debt
below 50 percent of GDP for the next seventy-five years. In May 1996 this
gap was 5.4 percent of GDP; by December 1999 the gap was only 0.5 per-
cent of GDP.
7
Of course, these numbers are forecasts; actual budget surpluses could
be substantially smaller or larger, even under unchanged policies. The
unexpected improvement in the budget over the past several years—and
the sharp deterioration in the early 1990s—provide little reassurance about
our ability to predict budget outcomes. Indeed, the OMB, the CBO, and
outside analysts regularly discuss many reasons why current projections
might not be realized. For example, Alan Auerbach and William Gale
argue that “current policy” is better described by holding discretionary
spending constant as a share of GDP rather than constant in real terms, as
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 5
5. This increase actually understates the favorable economic and technical revisions,
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7. CBO (1997a, 1999).
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change widens the fiscal gap by roughly 1 percent of GDP.
8 The CBO esti-
mates that the ﬁscal gap would increase by about 1 percent of GDP if tax
receipts declined to their average share of GDP before the surge of the
late 1990s.
9 Moreover, budget analysts face important uncertainty about
long-term productivity growth and increases in health spending. In sum,
there is substantial doubt about how rosy the current budget outlook really
is, but little doubt that it has improved dramatically of late and that the
improvement has changed the terms of the public debate about Social
Security reform.
Population Aging, National Saving, and 
Prefunding of Retirement Beneﬁts
Social Security benefits and administrative costs now equal 10.3 per-
cent of payroll (4.2 percent of GDP), and the retirement of the baby-boom
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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Percent of GDP
February 2000 administration policy
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Figure 1. Projections of Uniﬁed Budget Balance, 1990–2070
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, fiscal years
1998 and 2001 (February 1997 and February 2000), and unpublished OMB data.
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2030. Moreover, because the aging of the population is expected to be per-
manent, not temporary, this share is projected to reach 19.5 percent of pay-
roll in 2075. Since these beneﬁts generally correspond to consumption by
persons who will not be working, they represent a significant economic
burden for the nation. The projected increase in benefits also represents a
significant burden for the Social Security program, because dedicated
income from the payroll tax and the taxation of benefits is projected to
remain around 13 percent of payroll through 2075. In this section we
examine the appropriate response to population aging by the nation and by
the program itself.
The Central Role of National Saving
The primary way in which current generations can increase the
resources available to future generations—and thus absorb some of the
burden of an aging population—is to bequeath the ownership of a larger
quantity of physical capital. (We leave aside several related ways to help
future generations, including better education and more investment in
research and development to augment the stock of technical knowledge.)
It is relatively unimportant whether this additional capital is located in
the United States or overseas: the future consumption of domestic resi-
dents depends on their income, and tomorrow’s national income depends
primarily on today’s national saving, wherever that saving is invested.
Economists generally view the decisions of individuals as revealing
their true preferences. However, many economists have concluded that
U.S. national saving is too low. One piece of evidence is that the U.S.
national saving rate has for some time been lower than that of most other
developed countries and is now below its own historical average. Using
an explicit welfare function to aggregate the utility of different generations
may also suggest that the current capital stock is below its optimal level,
although alternative choices for the parameters of that function lead to dif-
ferent conclusions.
10 In addition, economists have identified some spe-
ciﬁc reasons why national saving might be lower than is desirable: house-
holds may be myopic or have time-inconsistent preferences,
11 government
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 7
10. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
11. Thaler and Shefrin (1981); Laibson (1997).
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12 and pay-as-
you-go retirement programs like Social Security and positive externali-
ties from capital accumulation may make the social return to saving
exceed the private return.
13
An additional, commonly voiced argument for raising national saving is
the aging of the population. In a life-cycle model, individuals prepare for
their own retirement by saving when they are young, and so it seems nat-
ural that a nation should increase its saving in advance of an expected
aging of its population. However, David Cutler and others show, as do
Elmendorf and Louise Sheiner, that population aging does not establish an
unambiguous case for higher saving.
14 The analogy to individual behav-
ior breaks down because whereas the anticipated withdrawal of one indi-
vidual from the labor force does not affect his or her expected return to
saving, the aging of the U.S. population in the aggregate will likely reduce
the return to national saving. In particular, the decline in fertility that is the
primary cause of our population aging will reduce labor force growth to
nearly zero by 2020; this will increase the capital-labor ratio and thereby
lower the marginal product of capital.
15 Optimal saving is depressed by the
lower return, but boosted by the greater demand for future resources. On
balance, Elmendorf and Sheiner conclude that projected population aging
in the United States does not justify large increases in saving; indeed, some
plausible specifications imply that current saving should actually decline
slightly in response to population aging.
Regardless of the optimal level of saving, the level of capital accumu-
lation accomplished by Social Security reform reflects the true prefund-
ing of future consumption, and it is nearly a sufficient statistic for what
current generations are doing for future generations. It is therefore of pri-
mary importance in comparing Social Security reform proposals.
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
12. Lucas (1990).
13. Feldstein (1974); Romer (1986). 
14. Cutler and others (1990); Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000).
15. The marginal product of capital would not fall if the United States were a completely
open part of a world capital market in which a fixed interest rate prevailed. However, net
capital ﬂows are not that large, and world interest rates will likely decline over time because
most other developed countries are aging even more rapidly than the United States.
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For sixty years Social Security has been primarily a pay-as-you-go
system, but the aging of the U.S. population will require sharp changes in
taxes or beneﬁts if the pay-as-you-go approach is to be maintained. Under
current projections, achieving balance between the system’s revenue and
outlays in 2075 would require a one-third cut in benefits or a one-half
increase in payroll taxes. Faced with that prospect, it is natural to con-
sider prefunding future beneﬁts by accumulating assets in the Social Secu-
rity trust fund.
16 Indeed, the effort has already begun. Social Security
reforms in 1977 and 1983 set payroll taxes above contemporaneous bene-
ﬁts, and the trust fund now holds roughly $1 trillion in government bonds.
Even so, the trust fund is projected to peak in 2024 and be exhausted in
2037, and maintaining solvency for the next seventy-five years (a tradi-
tional benchmark) is projected to require an immediate increase in pay-
roll taxes of 1.89 percentage points or an equivalent cut in beneﬁts.
The 1994–1996 Advisory Council on Social Security presented three
alternative reform plans that placed important emphasis on additional
prefunding and moved two other ideas to the center of the Social Security
debate: individual retirement saving accounts and investment in equi-
ties.
17The emphasis on prefunding has increased even more in the past few
years, primarily because of the emergence of large projected budget sur-
pluses. These surpluses offer a new funding source with relatively low
political cost: additional revenue can be directed to the Social Security
trust fund or to individual accounts without explicitly raising taxes, cutting
other spending, or incurring a deﬁcit. (There is, however, a political oppor-
tunity cost in the form of taxes not reduced and other spending not
increased.) For example, the advisory council’s Individual Accounts pro-
posal would have required taxpayers to contribute to new, individual retire-
ment saving accounts in addition to paying the current payroll tax; under
current budget projections, these accounts could instead be ﬁnanced using
“excess” general revenue. Reforming Social Security by legislating future
benefit cuts or tax increases appears to be especially unappealing to vot-
ers when the government already has a significant excess of tax revenue
over spending. Indeed, the political willingness to consider Social Security
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 9
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due largely to the potential to achieve long-term solvency in a politically
less painful way.
Prefunding of beneﬁts brings a number of possible advantages, depend-
ing on one’s viewpoint. First, dedicating some share of projected budget
surpluses to Social Security could help preserve those surpluses when they
might otherwise be used for tax cuts or spending increases. That is, if policy-
makers believe that more national saving is desirable but have difficulty
making the case to the public, justifying that saving in terms of strength-
ening Social Security might generate more popular support. Second, pre-
funding a rising stream of government outlays would help to smooth tax
rates over time and minimize the deadweight loss from future taxation.
18 In
particular, higher tax rates today not only would provide future generations
with additional capital, but would also increase the resources within the
government sector, reducing the need for high tax rates and large dead-
weight losses to transfer these resources into the government sector in the
future. Third, accumulating assets dedicated to paying Social Security
benefits would make it politically less likely that these benefits would be
cut in the future. If one is concerned that tomorrow’s elderly may ulti-
mately bear too large a share of any required budgetary adjustments,
strengthening the commitment to pay current-law benefits is important.
Fourth, some advocates believe that people should have greater control
over their own retirement savings, and granting such control requires pre-
funded individual accounts.
Prefunding of benefits also has potential disadvantages, again depend-
ing on one’s perspective. These disadvantages relate primarily to the lock-
ing in of future beneﬁt levels. First, if programmatic prefunding should fail
to accomplish a corresponding amount of economic prefunding, the result
would be to reinforce the commitment to pay current-law benefits with-
out increasing the resources available to meet that commitment. Such a
reform would simply shift future resources toward Social Security bene-
ficiaries and away from other U.S. residents. Second, current-law benefits,
even if prefunded through additional national saving, might already be
higher than desirable. Some analysts think the government should devote
a smaller share of its resources to retirees, and if, as suggested above,
population aging will reduce future consumption (relative to the case of no
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
18. Barro (1979).
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be especially inappropriate. Indeed, current generations could pass “polit-
ical capital” to future generations by legislating politically unpopular
benefit cuts or tax increases today. Third, preserving flexibility in future
benefit levels may be the right response to the tremendous uncertainty
about future economic conditions and social priorities. Ronald Lee and
Shripad Tuljapurkar estimate that, given uncertainty about future fertility,
mortality, productivity growth, and interest rates, the 95 percent confi-
dence interval for the pay-as-you-go Social Security payroll tax rate suf-
ﬁcient to cover beneﬁts in 2070 ranges from 16 percent to 34 percent.
19
Budget Policy
The effect of Social Security reform on national saving is the sum of its
effects on government saving and private saving. In this section and the
next, we explore the effect on government saving, which is complicated
by the potential impact of reform on other government taxes and spend-
ing (especially in light of the newly emphasized distinction between
Social Security and the rest of the government budget). In later sections
we analyze how the total capital accumulation accomplished by Social
Security reform is altered by household saving responses as well as by
changes in revenue from the taxation of capital and in the returns to cap-
ital and labor.
Social Security and the Uniﬁed Budget
In 1967 a government commission proposed that all revenue and expen-
diture of the federal government be included in a unified budget.
20 By
combining previously separate accounts, this change increased the trans-
parency of the budget and encouraged policymakers to make tax and
spending policy in an overall framework rather than in a fragmented way.
However, the 1983 Social Security reform officially took the two Social
Security trust funds (the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance trust fund and
the Disability Insurance trust fund) “off budget.” The detailed budget
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 11
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20. President’s Commission on Budget Concepts (1967).
9760-03  BPEA Elmendorf  12/21/2000 14:16  Page 11tables of both the OMB and the CBO subsequently showed the opera-
tions of those funds separately from the “on-budget” activities of the rest
of the government.
21 The on-budget and the off-budget accounts together
constitute the unified budget, whose surplus equals government saving.
The stock of debt held by the public falls by roughly the amount of the uni-
fied surplus (with the small difference stemming from technical factors
known as “other means of ﬁnance”).
Table 2 summarizes the on-budget, off-budget, and unified budget
accounts for fiscal years 1976, 1997, and 2000. In 1976 Social Security
was nearly in balance as a pay-as-you-go system, and the unified budget
deficit was quite close to the deficit in the on-budget account. By 1997
Social Security was running a substantial surplus that was more than off-
set by a non–Social Security deficit, leading to a small unified deficit.
And in 2000 both the off-budget account and the on-budget account
recorded surpluses, so that the uniﬁed budget was also in surplus.
Between 1967 and 1999 both public attention and the official budget
process focused on the unified budget. The underlying fiscal objective was
perceived as unified budget balance, at least on average over the business
cycle, although in fact deﬁcits were recorded in nearly every year. Thus, as
the fiscal outlook improved in the late 1990s, most policymakers viewed
the projected uniﬁed surpluses as the amounts available for new spending
or tax cuts. In the spring and summer of 1999, however, policymakers
shifted quite suddenly and dramatically to a different objective, that of bal-
ancing the budget excluding Social Security.
This shift occurred in part because of a perception that an on-budget
deficit (or, equivalently, a unified surplus smaller than the Social Security
surplus) constituted a “raid” on Social Security. In fact, the Social Secu-
rity trust fund receives special Treasury securities equal to the Social
Security surplus regardless of the financial position of the rest of the
government. The legitimate concern about the on-budget balance is
whether it is undermining the potential role of trust fund accumulation
in boosting government and national saving. To the extent that the
non–Social Security balance deteriorates when the Social Security bal-
12 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
21. The U.S. Postal Service is also off budget, but its annual surplus or deﬁcit is dwarfed
by the Social Security surplus, and the Clinton administration and others have recently
proposed taking Medicare off budget. However, in this paper we refer only to Social Secu-
rity as off budget.
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ance improves, the extra trust fund accumulation is a paper transaction
with no corresponding impact on national saving. To the extent, how-
ever, that this is not true, trust fund accumulation corresponds to an
improvement in the government’s overall financial position and to addi-
tional national saving.
22
Looking back over the uniﬁed deﬁcits and Social Security surpluses of
the past twenty years, we can consider the economic impact of trust fund
accumulation to date. The excess of payroll taxes over Social Security
benefits clearly reduced the unified budget deficit in a mechanical way.
At the same time, this reduction made the “deﬁcit problem” somewhat less
pressing in the public eye, so that other taxes were probably not raised as
22. Frances Perkins, secretary of labor under President Franklin Roosevelt, apparently
understood that building up the Social Security trust fund would have no economic effect
if the fund were not separated from the rest of the government budget. She wrote that “Obvi-
ously, so long as the Government was operating with a large deficit, any government ‘con-
tribution’would be merely a book-keeping entry crediting the social insurance fund, rather
than actual cash” (Perkins, 1946, p. 296).
Table 2. Off-Budget, On-Budget, and Uniﬁed Budget Accounts, Selected Fiscal Years
Billions of dollars
1976 1997 2000a
Social Security Social Security Social Security
balance and on- surplus and on- surplus and on-
Item budget deﬁcit budget deﬁcit budget surplus
Off-budget account 
(Social Security)
Taxes 68 405 496
Beneﬁts –74 –365 –407
Interest 3 41 60
Balance –3 81 148
On-budget account
Taxes 232 1,187 1,479
Noninterest outlays –273 –1,005 –1,180
Interest to Social Security –3 –41 –60
Interest to public –27 –244 –220
Balance –71 –103 19
Uniﬁed budget balance –74 –22 167
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2001,
February 2000.
a. Projected. These numbers are not consistent with the final data for fiscal year 2000 shown in table 1 because a detailed
decomposition of the on-budget and off-budget accounts has not been published by the OMB since February 2000.
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much, nor was other spending cut as much, as would have happened other-
wise. On balance, it seems likely that the buildup of the trust fund led to
incremental government saving, although less than dollar for dollar
because of the resulting changes in the rest of the government budget.
23
Looking ahead, a fundamental determinant of whether Social Security
reform will raise national saving is whether the new consensus to balance
the on-budget account will persist. It is noteworthy that the 1983 law tak-
ing Social Security off budget—and the reafﬁrmation of this action in the
budget legislation of 1985 and 1990—was not sufﬁcient to redirect public
attention to the on-budget balance.
24 In contrast, a number of state gov-
ernments have successfully focused their budget deliberations on revenue
and outlays excluding employee retirement funds. One threat to the new
consensus would be a worsening of the budget outlook that would require
spending cuts or tax increases to reach balance in the on-budget account
even with the government reporting an overall surplus. Another threat
could arise from the continuation of favorable budget trends. Debt held
by the public is now roughly $3.4 trillion, and the OMB projects that
Social Security surpluses will total nearly $2.5 trillion over the next twelve
years and be running over $300 billion per year at the end of that period.
25
Therefore, if the non–Social Security budget is balanced on average, debt
held by the public could be entirely paid off by 2012. After that point,
balancing the on-budget account would require the government to pur-
chase private assets in an amount equal to the Social Security surpluses.
This switch from paying off the national debt to building up a “national
asset” could signiﬁcantly alter the political context of budget policy.
Medicare and the Budget
Last summer the Clinton administration set forth a budget plan that
would take Medicare Part A off budget, like Social Security, and balance
the government’s remaining taxes and outlays.
26 Medicare Part A pro-
vides insurance for hospitalization; it is financed through the Hospital
23. Aaron and Reischauer (1998) argue that trust fund accumulation may understate
incremental capital because the return earned by the trust fund on the government bonds it
holds is less than the marginal product of capital.
24. Koitz (1998) reviews the history of Social Security’s budget status.
25. OMB (2000b).
26. OMB (2000b).
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streams (primarily the payroll tax) and, like the Social Security trust funds,
is expected to accumulate sizable balances in coming years.
27
The economic and budget issues regarding the prefunding of future
Medicare beneﬁts are quite similar to those for Social Security.
28 A grow-
ing balance in the Part A trust fund will correspond to economic prefund-
ing only if Part A surpluses are not part of the budget that the political
process tries to balance. Consider, for example, a hypothetical reduction in
hospital reimbursement rates (analogous to the cuts in Social Security bene-
ﬁts that we consider later). The decline in outlays would result in a larger
Part A surplus and additional bonds in the Part A trust fund. If Part A were
taken off budget, this incremental surplus would raise government and
national saving. However, if Part A remained on budget, lower Part A out-
lays might create the perception that more money is available for tax cuts
and new spending, and the policy would extend the solvency of the Part
A trust fund without raising saving or improving the government’s over-
all ﬁscal condition. Moreover, this analysis applies equally to reductions in
outlays arising from technical factors such as lower treatment intensity.
The idea of taking Medicare off budget has received much less attention
over the years than the idea of taking Social Security off budget, presum-
ably because Part A surpluses have been very small. However, legislative
action and favorable economic and technical changes have improved the
outlook for the trust fund substantially in the past seven years: its projected
exhaustion date has been pushed back from 1999 in April 1993, to 2012
in April 1998, and 2025 in April 2000. With a trust fund balance over
$150 billion and projected Part A surpluses of roughly $400 billion during
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27. Medicare Part B provides insurance for visits to physicians; it is ﬁnanced through the
Supplementary Medical Insurance trust fund, which receives one-quarter of its income from
beneﬁciary premiums and three-quarters from general revenue. Because these amounts are
set annually to cover expected costs, this trust fund holds only small working balances; its
removal from the budget would have no substantive effect on national saving, and the
administration did not propose it.
28. See Feldstein and Samwick (1997) and Feldstein (1999). Some of the same issues
also arise regarding the trust funds for retirement benefits for government employees: the
Civil Service Retirement Fund and the Military Retirement Fund. Contributions to these
trust funds by the relevant agency or employees or by the general fund augment fund bal-
ances, which now exceed $650 billion. But the contributions also count as offsetting on-
budget receipts and thus do not reduce the resources available for other purposes or con-
tribute to incremental government saving.
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29 substantial prefunding of Medicare benefits is now
on the horizon. Whether those surpluses will be off the table in discussions
of new spending and tax cuts is a consequential decision for the budget and
for national saving.
On-Budget Balance
The current political consensus essentially sets a two-part objective for
fiscal policy: balance the budget excluding retirement programs, and
ensure the solvency of retirement programs for the foreseeable future.
Although most of this paper is concerned with the positive implications
of political economy rules, the normative merits of the current consensus
deserve a brief discussion.
The current approach does not represent optimal fiscal policy in the
strict sense of the word. Economists have long noted that a zero balance
in the unified budget possesses no economic magic,
30 and balance in the
on-budget account combined with projected solvency for the retirement
system suffers from many of the same shortcomings. For example, optimal
fiscal policy would give some weight to the amount of outstanding gov-
ernment debt, and it would depend on an assessment of the distortions to
private saving and the adequacy of that saving. In addition, any attempt to
achieve budget balance each year, rather than on average across the busi-
ness cycle, would undermine the automatic ﬁscal stabilizers.
Nevertheless, we believe that the current two-part consensus is the best
practical framework for fiscal policy. Achieving balance in some budget
concept is a salient political objective, and the appropriate budget to bal-
ance (on a business-cycle-average basis) is the budget excluding retire-
ment programs, for several reasons. First, this approach encourages
forward-looking policymaking in the face of population aging. It is now a
truism to remark that current budget surpluses should not be dissipated
casually, because future budget demands will be much greater. In this sit-
uation, focusing on the surplus remaining after setting aside the resources
needed to prefund those future demands gives a more accurate picture of
our overall fiscal position. Second, this approach reinforces a long-term
focus in policymaking for Social Security. For example, this year’s par-
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
29. OMB (2000b).
30. For example, see Eisner (1986) and Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991).
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gible long-run effect on Social Security’s financial status; because the
annual budget debate now excludes Social Security, the short-run cost
was appropriately ignored in the discussion of this repeal.
31
Third, and most important, balancing the budget excluding Social Secu-
rity gives economic meaning to accumulations in the Social Security trust
fund: additional bonds in the trust fund are then matched dollar for dollar
by a reduction in government debt held by the public and additional gov-
ernment saving. The government budget is essentially a cash-ﬂow account-
ing system, and the political process tends (as already noted) to push the
net cash flow of some budget concept toward zero. Therefore, govern-
ment saving can occur on a consistent basis only outside of whatever bud-
get concept is balanced; trust funds inside that budget concept may have
political and programmatic implications but do not have economic ones.
32
Social Security Reform and the Political Economy of the Budget
With these budget concepts in hand, we can now analyze the effect of
Social Security reform on saving under alternative approaches to setting
spending and taxes in the non–Social Security part of the budget. The
reform proposals of the past several years involve different combinations
of ﬁve canonical elements: cuts in Social Security beneﬁts or increases in
payroll taxes; transfers of on-budget revenue to the Social Security trust
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31. Indeed, a majority of the 1983 Social Security commission favored taking Social
Security out of the budget partly to ensure that reforms were “made only for programmatic
reasons, and not for purposes of balancing the budget” (National Commission on Social
Security Reform, 1983, p. 2-24). A partly countervailing argument is that small changes in
Social Security may have too little impact on seventy-ﬁve-year solvency to receive as much
attention as they would in the annual budget process. Thus the minority on the commission
who opposed taking Social Security off budget deemed it “important to ensure that the
financial condition of the Social Security program be constantly visible to the Congress
and the public” (National Commission on Social Security Reform, 1983, p. 2-25).
32. It is sometimes said that an on-budget focus will lead to less saving than would a uni-
ﬁed budget focus when Social Security begins to run deﬁcits. This argument ignores the sec-
ond part of the current consensus by assuming that no actions will be taken in the next
twenty-ﬁve years to extend Social Security’s solvency. Moreover, the goal of focusing on the
on-budget account is not to raise saving arbitrarily but to match trust fund accumulations
with saving; if future demographic changes justify a reduction in the trust fund, the result-
ing decline in saving need not be regretted.
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revenue to individual accounts (“add-on” accounts); and contributions of
Social Security revenue to individual accounts (“carve-out” accounts).
We assume that withdrawals from individual accounts will be taxed just
as Social Security beneﬁts are, with most of the revenue accruing to Social
Security.
33 In addition, some reform proposals “claw back” (that is, tax) a
large share of these withdrawals and direct those revenues to Social Secu-
rity to help ﬁnance traditional beneﬁts.
National Saving and Its Composition
The effect of Social Security reform on national saving is the sum of
its effects on government saving, personal saving, and business saving. We
divide government saving into the Social Security surplus and the on-
budget surplus, and we assume that the surpluses of state and local gov-
ernments are unaffected by reform. We divide personal saving into saving
within individual accounts and household saving. Saving in each of these
four sectors equals the return on that sector’s stock of net assets, plus other
income, less other outgo. The return on net assets includes (where rele-
vant) bond coupon payments, equity dividends, and capital gains on equi-
ties. We do not allow for revaluations of existing capital (that is, for
changes in Tobin’s q), and so these capital gains reﬂect appreciation owing
to retained earnings and therefore correspond to business saving. Thus
we do not model the business sector explicitly but rather “pierce the cor-
porate veil” and attribute business saving to the other sectors. Saving in
each sector can be deﬁned as follows: 
Social Security saving (Social Security surplus) =
Social Security taxes (SST)
– Social Security beneﬁts (SSB)
+ transfers from the on-budget account to Social Security (TRANS)
– Social Security contributions to individual accounts (SSCON)
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
33. In 1999 taxation of Social Security benefits reaped $12 billion for the two Social
Security trust funds and $7 billion for the Hospital Insurance trust fund (Board of Trustees
of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 2000; Board
of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Fund, 2000). Our saving estimates include
the ﬂow of revenue to the Social Security trust funds.
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(CLAW)
+ the return on net assets of the Social Security trust fund (SSR).
On-budget government saving (on-budget surplus) =
non–Social Security taxes (T)
– non–Social Security spending excluding interest (G)
– transfers from the on-budget account to Social Security (TRANS)
– on-budget contributions to individual accounts (OBCON)
+ the return on net assets in the on-budget account (OBR).
Individual account saving =
Social Security contributions to individual accounts (SSCON)
+ on-budget contributions to individual accounts (OBCON)
– withdrawals from individual accounts for consumption (WITH)
– clawbacks and taxes on withdrawals from individual accounts
(CLAW)
+ the return on net assets in individual accounts (IAR).
Household saving =
household saving apart from the return on existing assets (HS)
+ the return on household assets (HR).
Because many of these components of saving cancel across sectors,
the effect of Social Security reform on national saving can be written as:
where NS = national saving and R = SSR + OBR + IAR + HR = national
income from capital. Changes in on-budget taxes and spending have two
sources: changes in capital tax revenue owing to changes in capital accu-
mulation in prior years, and the response of the budget process to Social
Security reform. This budget policy response could include changes in
both taxes and spending, but we generally refer just to spending for sim-
plicity. To focus on this response in the rest of this section, we leave aside
any changes in household saving, capital tax revenue, and the return on
incremental saving in previous years. Under these restrictions:
() –– – . 2 ∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ NS SST SSB WITH G =
() –– – , 1 ∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆∆ NS SST SSB WITH G T HS R =+ + +
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We study four alternative descriptions of the response of on-budget
taxes and spending to budget developments. These “political economy
rules” are meant as positive descriptions of how budget policy might
respond to Social Security reform, not as prescriptions or as proposals for
budget rules to constrain the political process. Although we show that
these on-budget responses to Social Security reform can substantially off-
set the apparent saving effects of some reforms, it is worth noting that free-
ing up resources for important social purposes apart from Social Security
is one plausible goal of reform. 
Our alternative political economy rules are the following:
Rule 1:There is no pressure to move the budget into balance from either
surplus or deficit. Therefore, on-budget taxes and spending do not adjust
in response to changes in the budget balance that arise from Social Secu-
rity reform.
Rule 2: The political process aims to balance the (cyclically adjusted)
uniﬁed budget. Therefore, on-budget taxes and spending adjust to achieve
uniﬁed budget balance.
Rule 3: The political process aims to balance the (cyclically adjusted)
on-budget account. Therefore, on-budget taxes and spending adjust to
achieve on-budget balance.
Rule 4: The political process aims to balance the unified budget, as in
rule 2, but does so gradually and asymmetrically by eliminating surpluses
faster than deﬁcits.
Judging which of these rules might best describe future policymaking is
extremely difficult. We include rule 1 solely as a benchmark, because it
seems clear that the budget balance does affect tax and spending policy.
For example, Auerbach estimates that 30 to 40 percent of the average
shock to the unified budget balance during the past fifteen years was
reversed through tax or spending changes over the following five years;
Henning Bohn finds that the U.S. primary surplus (the surplus excluding
interest payments) responds to changes in the debt-GDP ratio.
34Yet there
20 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
34. Auerbach (2000); Bohn (1998).
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35 For the entire
period of Auerbach’s analysis, the uniﬁed budget was in deﬁcit and the on-
budget account was in deeper deficit; hence the data exhibit no variation
that could allow one to distinguish among rules 2, 3, and 4. As noted ear-
lier, our informal interpretation of the budget process during the past sev-
eral decades is that 1999 witnessed a striking shift from a traditional focus
on unified budget balance to a new focus on on-budget balance. We have
little insight into whether that new focus will persist indeﬁnitely (rule 3) or
revert in the near future (rule 2 or rule 4). Indeed, it is possible to think of
other plausible paths: for example, policy might seek to balance the on-
budget account until publicly held debt is eliminated, then switch to bal-
ancing the unified budget so as to avoid accumulating a national asset. A
useful extension to this paper would be an evaluation of the plausibility
of these rules in the context of a voting model.
Interaction of Reforms and Political Economy Rules
Table 3 shows how each of the ﬁve canonical elements of Social Secu-
rity reform would affect national saving under each of the first three
political economy rules. We skip the remaining rule as a straightforward
variant on the second, and we continue to leave aside any changes in
household saving, capital tax revenue, and the return on incremental sav-
ing in previous years.
Under rule 1, with no change in other government spending in
response to Social Security reform, the change in national saving from
Social Security reform equals the change in SST – SSB – WITH. Note
that Social Security benefits and withdrawals from individual accounts
enter this expression identically: what matters for national saving under
this rule is the level of overall retirement benefits, not their source. Cut-
ting Social Security benefits or raising payroll taxes increases saving by
Social Security; with no offsetting on-budget response, government sav-
ing rises. In contrast, transfers of on-budget revenue to the Social Security
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35. Skilling (2000) ﬁnds, in a sample of nineteen member countries of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development over 1960–99, that fiscal policy is loosened
in good economic times but not proportionately tightened in bad economic times (corre-
sponding to our fourth rule). He attributes this result to coordination failure among loss-
averse politicians.
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plus by an equal amount, leading to no change in saving. Selling bonds
from the trust fund to purchase equities is just a new portfolio choice (or
asset swap) and has no effect on saving. (In the next section we discuss
the ramifications of equity purchases more fully.) Contributions to indi-
vidual accounts reduce saving indirectly. The contributions themselves
lower government saving but raise saving in individual accounts by an
equal amount. However, future withdrawals from the accounts raise con-
sumption, so that national saving declines on balance.
Under rule 2, government saving equals zero, and the change in national
saving from Social Security reform equals the saving in individual
accounts (OBCON + SSCON – WITH – CLAW). Cutting Social Security
beneﬁts or raising payroll taxes increases saving by Social Security, but the
incipient unified surplus is entirely dissipated through additional on-
budget spending; national saving is unaffected. On-budget transfers to
Social Security also have no effect on the uniﬁed budget balance, but when
the president proposed such transfers in his 1999 State of the Union
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
Table 3. Effects of Proposed Social Security Reforms on National Saving under
Alternative Political Economy Rules
Rule 2: Rule 3:
Rule 1: Balance the Balance the
No budget uniﬁed on-budget
Reform element response budget account
Decrease Social Security  Increase saving No effect Increase saving
beneﬁts or increase 
payroll taxes
Transfer on-budget revenue  No effect No effecta Increase saving
to the Social Security 
trust fund
Purchase equities for the  No effect No effect No effect
Social Security trust fund
Contribute on-budget  Decrease saving Increase saving Increase saving
revenue to individual 
accounts
Contribute Social Security  Decrease saving Increase saving Decrease saving
revenue to individual 
accounts
a. Except under a special budget scoring rule whereby transfers of the surplus reduce resources available for other purposes,
in which case saving increases.
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of the transfers. If this special scoring rule were accepted in the political
discourse, other government spending would decline and national saving
would increase. Buying equities is, again, simply an asset swap. It does
reduce the unified surplus—thereby crowding out other spending—under
current budget scoring rules that treat purchases of private securities as
outlays. However, our estimates assume that this rule would not persist if
the government purchased significant amounts of financial assets.
36 In
sum, saving in the government sector is impossible under this political
economy rule unless the budget process endorses some unnatural scoring
convention. Contributions to individual accounts, whether from the on-
budget account or from Social Security, engender equal declines in other
government spending in order to maintain uniﬁed budget balance, and the
extra saving associated with account inﬂows outweighs the reduced saving
associated with account withdrawals in all the plans we consider.
37
Under rule 3, the change in national saving from Social Security reform
equals the change in SST – SSB – WITH + TRANS + OBCON. Cutting
Social Security beneﬁts or raising payroll taxes increases saving by Social
Security; with no opposing on-budget response, government saving rises.
On-budget transfers to Social Security increase Social Security saving, and
they leave the on-budget surplus unchanged because residual spending
declines by the amount of the transfers; again, saving rises. Equity pur-
chases have no effect on saving, as before. Contributions to individual
accounts from the on-budget account engender equal declines in on-budget
spending, and the saving from these contributions dominates the dissaving
from the withdrawals. In contrast, contributions to individual accounts
from the Social Security trust fund do not cause any changes in other
spending, and so the overall effect is a reduction in saving.
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36. How to score the appreciation of stocks held by the trust fund is unclear. We will
see later that if the higher return on trust fund assets is allowed to increase the uniﬁed bud-
get balance (leading to increases in other spending), investing the trust fund in equities can
actually reduce saving. If the Social Security surplus were defined as the change in the
trust fund’s market value, the uniﬁed budget balance would ﬂuctuate with stock prices. If the
surplus were deﬁned differently (for example, based on an expected equity return rather than
the realized return), the value of trust fund assets could diverge from the cumulative sur-
pluses. Penner (1998) discusses this issue.
37. Contributions to individual accounts could reduce saving if the return earned by the
accounts were sufﬁciently higher than the return earned by other sectors of the economy.
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ﬁts or raising payroll taxes boosts national saving unless policymakers aim
to balance the unified budget, in which case the freed-up resources are
used for other spending or for tax cuts. General revenue transfers to the
trust fund raise saving only if policymakers balance the on-budget account
or take the transferred amounts off the table in some ad hoc fashion. Equity
purchases raise saving only if scoring rules continue to treat these asset
swaps as an outlay. Financing individual accounts from the on-budget
account raises saving if policymakers balance either the on-budget account
or the uniﬁed budget; ﬁnancing individual accounts from the Social Secu-
rity trust fund increases saving only if policymakers aim to balance the
uniﬁed budget.
Methodology for Estimating the Impact 
of Social Security Reform on National Saving
Our methodology is essentially an accounting exercise, in which we
model the inflow, outflow, and accumulation of net assets each year for
each sector of the economy. We perform this exercise for alternative Social
Security reforms under various assumptions about how the budget policy
process, the household sector, and the economy respond to Social Security
reform. Our prereform projections of trust fund finances come from the
Social Security actuaries,
38 and our projections of the rest of the budget
come from OMB estimates under the president’s policy (scaled to the actu-
aries’projection of GDP).
39We also use the actuaries’detailed data to con-
struct a demographic model for tracking individual account balances and
withdrawals for each cohort of workers. In this section we describe the
remaining aspects of our methodology: our assumptions about capital allo-
cation and rates of return, our treatment of risk, the response of capital
taxes to reform, the response of household saving to reform, and the
general-equilibrium effects of reform.
24 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
38. Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors and Disability Insurance
Trust Funds (2000).
39. OMB (2000a).
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We assume that incremental national saving is allocated equally to cor-
porate capital, housing capital, and overseas capital.
40 The empirical evi-
dence on international capital ﬂows suggests that roughly two-thirds of sav-
ing in developed countries is retained for domestic investment over long
periods, with the remaining third flowing overseas. Martin Feldstein and
Charles Horioka found larger values of the saving retention coefficient,
but subsequent estimates by Feldstein and Philippe Bacchetta were
smaller.
41A recent paper by Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff reports
that “only” 60 percent of incremental saving by OECD countries remained
in the home country between 1990 and 1997.
42 The increasing integration
of global capital markets suggests that domestic retention of saving will
drop further over time, and the CBO has used a 60 percent rate in its mod-
eling.
43 We are reluctant to put too much weight on the most recent
evidence, however, and so we use a value of two-thirds. For domestic cap-
ital the Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates that the value of ﬁxed pri-
vate residential capital at current cost is nearly identical to that of fixed
private nonresidential capital.
44We simply assume that incremental domes-
tic investment is divided in the same proportion.
We use the following rates of return. For corporate capital we take
James Poterba’s estimate of a 7.6 percent real rate of return after paying
state and local taxes, which amounts to a nominal rate of return of 11 per-
cent based on the actuaries’projected inflation rate of 3.2 percent.
45 For
government bonds issued to the trust fund, we adopt the actuaries’ pro-
jected nominal rate of return of 6.3 percent (following a brief transition).
We assume that the rate of return on government bonds sold to the public
is 20 basis points lower than that, because public debt has shorter average
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40. We ignore noncorporate, nonhousing capital for simplicity. This omission distorts
our results only to the extent that the return and the tax rate on that asset differ from the aver-
age return and tax rate on the assets we include.
41. Feldstein and Horioka (1980); Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991).
42. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).
43. CBO (1997b).
44. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1997).
45. Poterba (1998). Speciﬁcally, 1.076   1.032 = 1.11. In using the return after state and
local taxes, we are assuming that those governments spend rather than save any additional
revenue they receive.
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because of its greater risk (this is the value used by the actuaries); that the
return on equity is 390 basis points higher, producing a 7 percent real rate
of return (this is the value assumed by the 1994–1996 Advisory Council
and used in the actuaries’ scoring of reform proposals); and that the rate
of return on housing and overseas capital (which we generally combine for
simplicity) is 260 basis points higher. We calculate the last value by
assuming that after-tax returns to housing, overseas, and corporate capital
all equilibrate (assuming implicitly that the assets are equally risky); we
describe the tax rates below. We assume that corporate capital is ﬁnanced
with debt and equity in a 1:3 ratio, a choice that compromises between
the estimates of Auerbach and Poterba.
46 The returns on equity and debt
are consistent with the underlying return to corporate capital after corpo-
rate income tax (based on the tax rate shown below). Moreover, the returns
on corporate and housing capital are consistent with Elmendorf and
Gregory Mankiw’s estimate of the overall rate of return to capital.
47
Treatment of Risk
Like much analysis of Social Security reform, as well as ofﬁcial Social
Security and budget projections, our methodology is based on the expected
values of future variables. Yet the uncertainty surrounding those expecta-
tions is very large: we have already discussed the uncertainty of budget
forecasts and noted Lee and Tuljapurkar’s estimate that a 95 percent con-
ﬁdence interval for Social Security beneﬁts in 2070 ranges from 16 percent
of payroll to twice that share. Moreover, political risk regarding future
beneﬁt and tax rules may be quite important.
Some of our estimates are invariant to certain kinds of risk: under the
three political economy rules that treat surpluses and deficits symmetri-
cally, changes in the baseline budget balance do not change the estimated
effect of reform on national saving. And a few of our estimates explore
sensitivity to risk: for the asymmetric rule, we report saving effects under
both the official baseline and a more pessimistic one. In general, how-
ever, we leave risk aside as an issue beyond the scope of this paper.
26 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
46. Auerbach (1996); Poterba (1998).
47. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
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to different assets. When the Social Security actuaries analyze reform
proposals, they assume that equities will earn a substantially higher return
than bonds; as a result, increasing the equity share of the trust fund or of
individual accounts allows for longer solvency or higher benefits without
raising taxes or contributions. The apparent implication of an arbitrage
opportunity in portfolio choice has raised strong concerns,
48 and a growing
literature considers the appropriate accounting for equity risk in evaluating
reform proposals and the appropriate allocation of equity risk in a
reformed system.
49
The key point for our purpose is that swapping assets between sectors
has no effect on national saving.
50 Our methodology captures this princi-
ple naturally: we track the holdings of each asset by each sector, so that
trust fund equity purchases (and corresponding bond sales) reduce the
return on household wealth by exactly the amount that they raise the
return on the trust fund. The crucial uncertainty we cannot avoid involves
the marginal product of capital. If capital earns a lower or higher return 
in the future, near-term saving will have a smaller or a larger effect,
respectively, on the ultimate capital stock. Our estimates that incorporate
the general-equilibrium effects of reform provide some sensitivity 
analysis on this issue, because those estimates involve varying returns to
capital.
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48. For example, see 1999 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (1999).
49. For example, see Smetters (1998, 1999) and Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick
(1999). Some of the popular appeal of equity investments may stem from a more basic
confusion. The return on Social Security taxes is now well below average returns on pri-
vate retirement accounts, and part of this difference arises because private accounts tend to
hold riskier assets than the government bonds held by the trust fund. Yet most of the differ-
ence is unrelated to investment strategy and is due to the implicit debt that arises in pay-as-
you-go systems from paying benefits to initial generations in excess of their contributions.
Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998) explain the differences between privatization,
prefunding, and diversiﬁcation.
50. There are some circumstances under which equity investments by Social Security
may be more than just an asset swap. Abel (2000) and Diamond and Geanakoplos (1999)
explore the general-equilibrium effects of reform in the case of market imperfections that
discourage some households from owning equities. However, these effects are likely to be
much smaller than the effects studied in this paper. Abel (2000) finds that accounting for
these effects would reduce the aggregate capital stock by only $138 million (50 cents per
capita).
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If Social Security reform affects national saving or redirects existing
saving to untaxed individual accounts, it will also affect government rev-
enue from capital taxes. Indeed, some reform proposals treat such incre-
mental revenue as an important source of funding.
51
Our calculations of incremental capital tax revenue are based on Auer-
bach’s estimates of effective tax rates.
52 For corporate capital we combine
his estimates of the shares of debt and equity held by households, tax-
exempt institutions, and insurance companies with his estimates of real tax
rates on interest, dividends, and capital gains for each of these asset hold-
ers to construct real tax rates on returns to bonds and equities. Given these
rates and Auerbach’s estimate of the total tax burden on corporate capital,
we derive the real tax rate at the corporate level. This rate is well below the
tax rate on corporate proﬁts, because part of the total capital return is dis-
tributed through interest payments that are not taxed at the corporate
level.
53These estimates of real tax rates are quite consistent with Poterba’s
calculations for the 1990–96 period.
54 Finally, we convert these real tax
rates to nominal rates in order to link up with the actuaries’projections of
Social Security’s nominal flows.
55 For housing capital we use Auerbach’s
estimate of the individual tax rate converted to nominal terms. For over-
seas capital we assume an effective tax rate at the corporate level of zero
and an effective rate at the individual level that is the same as that for
domestic corporate capital.
56
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51. Feldstein and Samwick (1998, 2000).
52. Auerbach (1996).
53. Auerbach reports a “corporate tax rate” that is effectively the rate on corporate equity
capital, and he combines the deductibility of payments on corporate debt capital with the
individual tax on equity and interest income. That grouping is misleading for our purpose,
which is to determine the tax revenue from assets that are held in untaxed individual
accounts.
54. Poterba (1998).
55. Specifically, we calculate the nominal tax rate that produces the same after-tax real
return. With corporate capital, for example, a real tax rate of 21.7 percent corresponds to a
nominal tax rate of 15.4 percent when inﬂation is 3.2 percent and the real before-tax return
is 7.6 percent: 1 + 0.076   (1 – 0.217) = {1 + [(1 + 0.076)   (1 + 0.032) – 1]   (1 –
0.154)}/(1 + 0.032). Our calculated nominal tax rates at the individual level are 6.6 percent
for equities, 9.9 percent for bonds, 3.2 percent for housing, and 7.8 percent on foreign
capital.
56. These assumptions are not precisely correct. Because credits for taxes paid over-
seas cannot exceed domestic tax liability (but can fall short of it), corporate tax revenue from
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$100 from the Social Security trust fund to individual accounts (a “carve-
out”) in a political regime that balances the unified budget. Government
saving is unchanged, and saving in individual accounts rises by $105: the
$100 transfer plus a within-year return of about $5. The incremental $105
in national saving produces $35 each of additional corporate, housing, and
overseas capital; the stock of government bonds is unchanged. The change
in tax revenue can be decomposed into the effect of adding $105 to house-
hold wealth and the effect of shifting $105 into individual accounts that are
untaxed at the personal level. For the first effect, the extra revenue from
corporate capital is $0.85 ($35 times the 11 percent rate of return times the
22 percent combined corporate and individual tax rate), and the extra rev-
enue from housing and overseas capital is $0.35 ($70 times the 9.1 percent
rate of return times the 5.5 percent individual tax rate). For the second
effect, we assume that individual account balances are 60 percent equities
and 40 percent government bonds, so the weighted-average return after
corporate tax is 8.7 percent, and the individual tax rate if the assets were
held directly by households would be 7.5 percent. Thus the loss in revenue
from the shift to individual accounts is $0.69 ($105 times 8.7 percent times
7.5 percent), and the net revenue gain is $0.51, or roughly 0.5 percent of
the $100 contribution.
Moreover, this example ignores any reduction in household saving
spurred by the funding of individual accounts. As we explain shortly, some
of our calculations assume that a $100 contribution to individual accounts
would reduce household saving by $40. In this scenario the change in tax
revenue can be decomposed into the effects of adding $65 to household
wealth and shifting $105 into untaxed accounts—with a net increase in
revenue of only $0.03.
Even our larger estimate is only one-quarter of the 2.0 percent effec-
tive tax rate used by Feldstein and Andrew Samwick.
57 The difference
stems from two factors. First, we assume that two-thirds of the additional
capital goes overseas or into housing, where it is taxed at a lower rate
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direct overseas investments is small but nonzero. Also, Hines (1996) shows that firms pay
more dividends out of their foreign earnings, so the effective personal tax rate is somewhat
higher on foreign capital.
57. Feldstein and Samwick (2000).
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assuming that only one-fifth of incremental capital went outside the cor-
porate sector and that the effective tax rate on that capital was zero, incre-
mental taxes would rise to $1.34. Second, we use a lower corporate tax
rate, which accounts for the remaining difference.
The Response of Household Saving to Social Security Reform
We determine household saving using simple rules of thumb rather than
a formal optimizing model. We assume that households save all of their
incremental after-tax capital income and respond to three aspects of Social
Security reform, described below. Although the magnitude of these
responses is very uncertain, the impact of household behavior on our esti-
mates of national saving under alternative reforms is too important to be
omitted.
58
We assume that households increase their saving by 25 percent of any
increase in the uniﬁed budget deﬁcit, so that a $1 rise in the deﬁcit would
lower national saving by only 75 cents. Part of the change in household
saving can be attributed to forward-looking consumers who realize that
additional government debt will force higher future taxes; another part
may be a reaction to higher interest rates as additional debt crowds out pri-
vate capital. Large literatures on these topics have not reached a consensus
on the size of these effects,
59 but we choose a response somewhat smaller
than the 40 percent offset used by the CBO (1999).
We also assume that households increase their saving by 25 percent of
any reduction in future Social Security benefits.
60 This value is the mid-
point in the CBO’s assessment of research on this issue: “Each dollar of
Social Security wealth reduces other assets by between zero and 50cents,”
although “those estimates are uncertain, and higher or lower estimates can-
not be ruled out.”
61
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58. Engen and Gale (1997) offer a detailed discussion of this topic.
59. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999); Elmendorf (1996).
60. We do not model a household response to improvements in the trust fund’s ﬁnancial
position. Although such improvements increase the likelihood of people receiving current-
law beneﬁts, all of the plans we consider achieve seventy-ﬁve-year solvency for Social Secu-
rity, and therefore greater confidence about benefits should not have a differential effect
across plans.
61. CBO (1998), p. 3.
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of future withdrawals from individual accounts that will be available for
consumption (rather than be clawed back or taxed). We choose an offset
larger than for Social Security benefits because the tangibility of the
accounts may be a stronger deterrent to saving. (On the other hand, indi-
vidual accounts could actually increase other saving by sensitizing peo-
ple to the importance of retirement planning.) The extensive empirical
evidence on the saving impact of individual retirement accounts (IRAs)
and 401(k)s cannot be applied directly here because the policy experi-
ments are different.
62 It seems clear that the net impact on saving is more
likely to be positive if individual accounts are funded in a redistributive
manner that provides larger contributions relative to earnings for low-
earning individuals. The reason is that low-income households have fewer
assets to draw down and are less likely to have employer-provided pen-
sions that could be trimmed. On balance, however, we believe that indi-
vidual accounts are likely to crowd out some other household saving.
63
General-Equilibrium Effects of Social Security Reform
If Social Security reform affects national saving and the domestic cap-
ital stock, it will also affect the returns on capital and labor. These general-
equilibrium effects change the rate at which incremental saving in each
year cumulates over time, as well as alter the Social Security tax base
and, eventually, Social Security beneﬁt levels.
We estimate the effect of additional capital accumulation on the returns
to capital and labor by parameterizing a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion. We assume a capital share of 0.31 and an initial capital-output ratio of
3.2 (both taken from average levels in the United States between 1960
and 1997).
64 Then we calculate the changes in the marginal products of
capital and labor as additional saving occurs. We assume that all asset
returns decline in the same proportion as does the marginal product of cap-
ital (this best captures the combination of two factors: that the various
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62. For examples of studies on the impact on saving of these existing types of accounts,
see Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996).
63. Samwick (2000) presents evidence consistent with a crowding out of saving and con-
cludes that there is “little evidence that countries that implement defined-contribution
reforms have higher trends in saving rates after the reform.”
64. These calculations update similar calculations in Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
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rate and the tax rate do not change). This effect is nontrivial: an increase in
the capital stock equal to 100 percent of prereform GDP reduces the mar-
ginal product of capital by roughly 1
3⁄4 percentage points. Additional sav-
ing also increases the marginal product of labor, which we incorporate into
our calculations of payroll tax receipts and Social Security beneﬁt levels.
65
However, we ignore any induced change in labor supply and assume that
changes in the return to inframarginal capital and labor are offsetting for
the on-budget account and for household saving.
Results
This section presents our basic results regarding the effect of Social
Security reform on national saving; the following section gives results for
a number of interesting extensions.
Reform Proposals
Table 4 summarizes seven hypothetical Social Security reforms that
represent the range of reform proposals introduced in Congress or dis-
cussed during the past several years.
TRANSFERRING THE ON-BUDGET SURPLUS TO THE TRUST FUND. This
approach was proposed by President Clinton in his 1999 State of the Union
address, and in a modified form in his mid-session review of the budget
later that year. In contrast to most other reform proposals, these proposals
do not achieve seventy-five-year solvency for the trust fund; they are
explicitly incomplete, and the president called for a bipartisan process to
determine further steps. For comparability with the other reform
approaches, we analyze not the administration’s proposal but a hypotheti-
cal plan that makes sufficient transfers from the on-budget account to
achieve seventy-ﬁve-year solvency with no other changes. The OMB pro-
jects that on-budget surpluses (incorporating the administration’s tax and
spending policies) will last until about 2060 and total about $3.4 trillion
32 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
65. Bosworth and Burtless (2000) analyze the general-equilibrium effects of Social
Security reform on workers with different earnings proﬁles.
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Table 4. Proposals to Reform Social Security
Reform proposal Description
Transfer surplus to trust fund Use on-budget surpluses to purchase Treasury bonds
for the Social Security trust fund. These transfers
total $3.4 trillion in present value and extend Social
Security’s solvency to 2075.
Invest half the trust fund in equities Invest 50 percent of Social Security trust fund assets
in equities over ten years. An 11 percent beneﬁt cut is
phased in linearly over thirty years. The ratio of trust
fund assets to beneﬁt payments is stable in 2075.
Add-on individual accounts Contribute on-budget revenue equal to 2 percent of
payroll to individual accounts. Withdrawals are taxed
like Social Security beneﬁts. A 32 percent cut in
traditional beneﬁts is phased in as account
withdrawals increase (11 percent of the cut after
twenty years, 58 percent after forty years, 87 percent
after ﬁfty years). Social Security is in pay-as-you-go
balance in 2075.
Clawback Contribute on-budget revenue equal to 2 percent of
payroll to individual accounts. Seventy-ﬁve percent
of redemptions are clawed back to the trust fund.
Remaining withdrawals are taxed like Social Security
beneﬁts. A 6 percent cut in traditional beneﬁts is
phased in as account withdrawals increase. The ratio
of trust fund assets to beneﬁt payments is stable in
2075.
Carve-out Contribute 2 percent of payroll from the trust fund to
individual accounts. Withdrawals are taxed like
Social Security beneﬁts. A 37 percent cut in
traditional beneﬁts is phased in linearly over thirty
years (faster than the buildup of the accounts). The
ratio of trust fund assets to beneﬁt payments is stable
in 2075.
Carve-out with transfers Contribute 2 percent of payroll from the trust fund to
individual accounts. Withdrawals are taxed like
Social Security beneﬁts. Transfer general revenue
equal to 2 percent of individual account assets to the
trust fund. A 33 percent cut in traditional beneﬁts is
phased in as account withdrawals increase. The trust
fund balance is negative between about 2030 and
2070 but positive and rising in 2075.
Payroll tax increase Raise the payroll tax, beginning in 2015, to maintain
annual pay-as-you-go balance in Social Security.
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66 our hypothetical plan transfers those surpluses to the
trust fund.
INVESTING HALF THE TRUST FUND IN EQUITIES. Some authors propose
investing part of the trust fund in equities, and this change was included
in President Clinton’s proposals.
67 We examine a plan in which 50 per-
cent of trust fund assets are invested in equities (phased in over ten years),
a much larger share than the 15 percent in the president’s plan but com-
parable to other proposals. To achieve a stable ratio of trust fund assets to
benefit payments in 2075, we include an 11 percent benefit cut phased in
linearly over thirty years. This cut approximates the financial impact of
reforms that are often part of this type of plan, such as raising the retire-
ment age and including more state and local government workers in Social
Security.
ESTABLISHING ADD-ON INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS. Our model plan con-
tributes on-budget revenue equal to 2 percent of payroll to individual
accounts; these accounts are invested 60 percent in corporate equities and
40 percent in government bonds, with annual administrative costs equal
to 40 basis points. Withdrawals from the accounts are taxed like Social
Security benefits. To achieve pay-as-you-go balance in Social Security in
2075, we include a 32 percent benefit cut phased in roughly at the rate
that account withdrawals increase. (A 29 percent benefit cut would be
sufﬁcient to meet the weaker standard of a stable trust fund ratio in 2075.)
This phase-in is fairly slow: even after forty years, signiﬁcant numbers of
retirees will have contributed to individual accounts for only a portion of
their careers, so that only 58 percent of the ultimate Social Security bene-
ﬁt cut is imposed by that point.
68
CLAWING BACK A PORTION OF WITHDRAWALS. Feldstein and Samwick as
well as Representatives William Archer (R-TX) and Clay Shaw (R-FL) have
proposed an alternative way to use budget surpluses to prefund future
retirement beneﬁts.
69Their plans would establish individual accounts com-
parable to the add-on accounts just discussed, but withdrawals from the
accounts would effectively be taxed at a very high rate and the proceeds
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
66. OMB (2000a).
67. Ball and others (1997); Ball (1998); Aaron and Reischauer (1998).
68. Feldstein and Liebman (2000) analyze the intracohort distributional impact of a fully
phased-in plan of this type.
69. Feldstein and Samwick (1998); Archer and Shaw (1999).
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ments in these accounts, but the trust fund would be the ultimate claimant
on most of their value; thus this approach is sometimes viewed as a way
to keep investment decisions in private hands while allowing Social Secu-
rity to realize the higher expected return on equities. However, the viabil-
ity of a 75 percent or higher tax rate is unclear.
70 We analyze a plan in
which 75 percent of the withdrawals from individual accounts (funded by
2 percent of payroll from on-budget revenue as in the previous plan) are
clawed back. We include a 6 percent beneﬁt cut phased in with the buildup
of individual accounts to achieve a stable trust fund ratio in 2075.
CREATING A CARVE-OUT. The Personal Savings Accounts proposal of the
1994–1996 Advisory Council would have diverted 5 percentage points of
the existing 12.4 percent Social Security payroll tax to individual accounts.
The remainder of the tax would have paid for current-law disability and sur-
vivor benefits and for much smaller Social Security retirement benefits.
71
We analyze a smaller carve-out of 2 percentage points of the payroll tax,
similar to that proposed by Senators John Breaux (D-LA) and Judd Gregg
(R-NH) and Representatives Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) and Charles Stenholm (D-TX).
To achieve a stable trust fund ratio in 2075, we include a 37 percent cut in
traditional Social Security beneﬁts phased in linearly over thirty years (sub-
stantially faster than the buildup of the individual accounts).
COMBINING A CARVE-OUT WITH TRANSFERS. Various hybrid reform pro-
posals combine features of the ﬁrst ﬁve plans. For example, some propos-
als would transfer on-budget revenue to both the trust fund and individual
accounts. In this case the trust fund investments could mirror individuals’
investment decisions for their accounts, thus addressing some of the cor-
porate governance concerns related to collective investing in a somewhat
different fashion than in the clawback plans. To illustrate the ways in
which plans can be combined, we study a different hybrid plan modeled
after Feldstein and Samwick,
72 which combines a carve-out individual
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70. The clawback can also be speciﬁed as a reduction in Social Security beneﬁts equal to
some fraction of the account withdrawals. For example, a worker might lose 75 cents of
Social Security beneﬁts for each dollar of retirement income from an individual account.
71. This carve-out proposal would have replaced part of the progressive Social Security
benefit with an individual account that was funded with contributions proportional to a
worker’s earnings. To maintain redistribution from high earners to low earners, this proposal
would have converted the remaining beneﬁt to a beneﬁt that was equal for all retirees.
72. Feldstein and Samwick (2000).
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a version of their plan that includes a carve-out of 2 percent of payroll, a
33 percent Social Security benefit cut phased in at the same rate that
account withdrawals increase, and annual general revenue transfers equal
to 2 percent of the value of total assets in individual accounts in that year.
These parameters produce a negative trust fund balance between about
2030 and 2070, but the trust fund balance is positive and rising by 2075.
73
INCREASING THE PAYROLL TAX. We analyze the effect of raising the pay-
roll tax, beginning in 2015, to maintain annual pay-as-you-go balance in
Social Security. This approach has not been part of the recent political
debate, but it provides a useful counterpoint to plans that emphasize pre-
funding and equity returns.
Capital Accumulation under Different Political Economy Rules
Table 5 shows the effect of each of these reform plans on capital accu-
mulation in 2070, expressed as percentages of GDP under the prereform
baseline. To focus for now on the political response to reform, these esti-
mates ignore changes in capital tax revenue, household saving, and
changes in the returns to capital and labor. We follow equation (2) in
decomposing the change in capital accumulation (the last column) into the
effect of cuts in Social Security benefits and increases in payroll taxes
(the first column), increases in consumption through individual accounts
(the second column), and declines in spending or increases in taxes in the
non–Social Security part of the budget (the third column).
The first panel displays results for political economy rule 1. Because
under this rule the non–Social Security budget does not respond to Social
Security reform, the third effect is zero for all plans. Transferring on-
budget resources to the trust fund has no effect on capital accumulation
36 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
73. Feldstein and Samwick describe their transfers (which in our estimates total $3.1 tril-
lion in present value over the next seventy-five years) as the extra tax revenue from incre-
mental capital accumulation, assuming that each dollar of assets held by individual accounts
generates 2 cents of tax revenue. Although our implementation of their plan makes the trans-
fers that they specify, our analysis, described above, suggests that the extra tax revenue from
incremental capital will be much smaller: only 0.5 cent on the dollar. In their analysis,
Feldstein and Samwick estimate that the trust fund balance becomes positive at an earlier
date than we do. This difference appears to arise from their assumption that individual
accounts are invested in a 60-40 stock-bond portfolio even after retirement, whereas we
assume that retirees shift to an all-bond portfolio.
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establish individual accounts. The plan that invests half of the trust fund
in equities boosts the capital stock not because of the investment switch
but because of the benefit cuts that are a part of this plan. The plan with
add-on individual accounts reduces capital accumulation relative to the
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Table 5. Effects of Proposed Social Security Reforms on Capital Accumulation in
2070 under Alternative Political Economy Rulesa
Percent of 2070 baseline GDP 
Capital accumulation from
Social Security Consumption
beneﬁt cut or from Decrease in Total
payroll tax individual on-budget capital
Reform proposal increase accounts spending accumulation
Rule 1: No budget response
Transfer surplus to trust fund 0 0 0 0
Invest half the trust fund 
in equities 144 0 0 144
Add-on individual accounts 180 –209 0 –28
Clawback 36 –78 0 –41
Carve-out 505 –209 0 296
Carve-out with transfers 186 –209 0 –22
Payroll tax increase 295 0 0 295
Rule 2: Balance the uniﬁed budget
Transfer surplus to trust fund 0 0 0 (110)b 0 (110)
Invest half the trust fund 
in equities 144 0 –351 –207
Add-on individual accounts 180 –209 140 111
Clawback 36 –78 153 111
Carve-out 505 –209 –185 111
Carve-out with transfers 186 –209 134 (211) 111 (188)
Payroll tax increase 295 0 –295 0
Rule 3: Balance the on-budget account
Transfer surplus to trust fund 0 0 331 331
Invest half the trust fund
in equities 144 0 6 150
Add-on individual accounts 180 –209 336 307
Clawback 36 –78 336 294
Carve-out 505 –209 6 302
Carve-out with transfers 186 –209 184 161
Payroll tax increase 295 0 13 308
Source: Authors’calculations.
a. Excludes capital taxation, household saving, and general-equilibrium effects.
b. Numbers in parentheses are calculated using a special budget scoring rule whereby transfers of the surplus reduce resources
available for other purposes.
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slightly exceeds the reduced consumption from Social Security benefit
cuts. In other words, total retirement benefits are slightly higher in this
plan than under current law, and this crowds out a small amount of capi-
tal. The clawback plan also reduces the capital stock a bit, with a smaller
cut in traditional beneﬁts creating less new saving, but with the individual
accounts generating less dissaving because people keep only a portion of
their withdrawals.
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The carve-out plan increases the capital stock substantially, as the rapid
benefit cut more than compensates for the additional consumption from
individual accounts. In contrast, the carve-out with transfers reduces the
capital stock a little because the benefit cuts are smaller and phased in
more slowly. This plan and the add-on individual accounts plan have
nearly identical effects on capital accumulation, because each combines
accounts funded by 2 percent of payroll with cuts of roughly 30 percent
in traditional benefits. More fundamentally, the plans add about the same
amount of extra resources to each part of the retirement system but pack-
age it differently. The add-on plan contributes on-budget revenue equal to
2 percent of payroll to individual accounts, whereas the carve-out with
transfers directs roughly the same amount to the trust fund while simulta-
neously redirecting that amount from the trust fund to individual accounts.
Indeed, the clawback plan also injects 2 percent of payroll into the retire-
ment system (with yet a different packaging) and has nearly the same
effect on saving. Finally, a pay-as-you-go increase in the payroll tax leads
to a substantial amount of new capital because of the increase in govern-
ment saving.
The second panel of table 5 shows the effect of the same plans under
political economy rule 2, in which on-budget spending or taxes adjust to
balance the unified budget. The first two columns are identical to the cor-
responding columns in the first panel, because the Social Security reform
plans specify benefit cuts, payroll tax increases, and individual account
withdrawals. The novelty in this panel is the numbers in the third column,
which are the effects of changes in on-budget spending. Transferring on-
budget revenue to the trust fund still has no effect on saving unless the polit-
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
74. Because the clawback rate is 75 percent, one might wonder why the reduced capital
accumulation due to consumption from individual accounts in the clawback plan is not
one-fourth of the reduction under the add-on plan. The explanation is that this column
includes the resources devoted to administrative costs, which do not depend on the existence
or size of a clawback.
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administration, in which the reported surplus (and thereby the funds avail-
able for other purposes) is reduced by the amount of the transfers. A key
feature of this political economy rule, which balances the unified budget,
is that beneﬁt cuts and payroll tax increases are exactly offset by increases
in on-budget spending. Thus the plan that invests half of the trust fund in
equities reduces capital accumulation, because the beneﬁt cuts are offset by
extra non–Social Security spending, and the higher return to the trust fund
increases the uniﬁed budget surplus and allows yet more spending.
The three plans that establish individual accounts without transfers to
the trust fund all boost capital accumulation by the same amount under
rule 2. This result arises because the different levels of beneﬁt cuts in these
plans are of no consequence in a uniﬁed budget world, and all three plans
fund individual accounts using 2 percent of payroll. The add-on plan
reduces capital accumulation by 28 percent of GDP (as shown in the first
panel of table 5) through the net effect of lower Social Security benefits
(180 percent of GDP) and consumption from individual accounts (209 per-
cent of GDP). On the other hand, under rule 2, the plan generates addi-
tional capital equal to 140 percent of GDP through cuts in on-budget
spending. This last ﬁgure can be broken down into an increase of 320 per-
cent of GDP due to spending crowded out by contributions to the accounts,
and a decrease of 180 percent of GDP due to spending crowded in by the
benefit cut. In other words, the traditional benefit cut has no net impact
on national saving under this political economy rule, whereas the saving in
the individual accounts (contributions less withdrawals) passes through
to national saving. The clawback plan makes the same account contribu-
tions and the same withdrawals, and so it has the same effect on saving.
The carve-out plan has the same effect as well, because the larger benefit
cut that boosted its saving impact in the ﬁrst panel is now offset by higher
on-budget spending.
75
The carve-out with transfers has the same effect on saving as the other
individual account plans under conventional scoring rules, but a larger
effect under the special scoring rule because the transfers crowd out addi-
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75. In the clawback plan, the incremental capital from lower on-budget spending—
153 percent of GDP—equals an increase of 320 percent due to account contributions plus
decreases of 36 percent and 131 percent due to offsets of the traditional benefit cut and
clawback revenue. In the carve-out plan, reduced capital from higher on-budget spend-
ing—185 percent of GDP—equals the same 320 percent less 505 percent from the extra
spending allowed by the larger benefit cut.
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saving under this budget rule, because the incipient increase in the uni-
ﬁed budget balance is dissipated in the on-budget account.
The third panel of table 5 shows the effect of the plans under political
economy rule 3, in which taxes and spending adjust to balance the
non–Social Security part of the budget. Transfers of on-budget revenue to
the trust fund now crowd out other spending and increase saving. Indeed,
such transfers boost saving much more than under the special scoring rule
in the previous panel, because the on-budget balance is reduced by interest
on previous transfers, a feature that was not part of the special scoring rule.
The plan that invests half of the trust fund in equities has essentially the
same effect as in the ﬁrst panel, with the extra capital generated primarily
by the traditional beneﬁt cut.
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The add-on, clawback, and carve-out plans increase saving by nearly
equal amounts under this rule. The first two plans—as well as the on-
budget transfers to the trust fund—take 2 percent of payroll out of the
on-budget account; the carve-out plan saves no on-budget resources, but
it reduces traditional Social Security benefits by an equivalent additional
amount in order to maintain solvency in the trust fund. Saving under all
three plans is much higher than in the middle panel, primarily because
cuts in traditional benefits are not offset by higher on-budget spending.
The carve-out with transfers raises saving by less than the preceding
plans, because its transfers (and the resulting crowding out of on-budget
spending) occur later.
77 Lastly, the pay-as-you-go tax increase raises sav-
ing in Social Security, and unlike in the second panel there is no offsetting
increase in other spending.
78
In summary, table 5 reveals four principles about the effect of Social
Security reform on capital accumulation. First, a given reform plan can
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
76. The small difference relative to the ﬁrst panel is due to a small decline in on-budget
spending, which results from different rates of return on trust fund debt and publicly held
debt.
77. We stated earlier that transfers in this plan are roughly equal to the use of on-budget
resources by the add-on and clawback plans. That statement referred to present values dis-
counted by the return on the government bonds held by the trust fund. In the present context,
the relevant discount rate is the marginal product of capital, so these back-loaded transfers
become relatively less valuable.
78. The small difference relative to the ﬁrst panel is due to a small decline in on-budget
spending, which results from different rates of return on trust fund debt and publicly held
debt.
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non–Social Security taxes and spending. Only three of the seven plans
increase saving if there is no change in other taxes and spending, but all
seven plans raise saving under one or both of the other political economy
rules. Second, reform plans that seem very different can have nearly iden-
tical effects on saving. This occurs both because many plans have similar
total retirement beneﬁts (based on similar amounts of new funding, pack-
aged in different ways) and because budget responses offset some differ-
ences among plans. Third, programmatic prefunding ensures economic
prefunding (that is, increased national saving) only if the political process
balances the budget excluding Social Security. Thus only in the bottom
panel of the table do tax increases, beneﬁt cuts, general-revenue contribu-
tions to individual accounts, and general-revenue transfers to the trust fund
all raise saving. Fourth, if policymakers balance the unified budget (leav-
ing aside the possibility of special scoring rules), reform plans can boost
saving only by moving money out of the government to individual
accounts. Indeed, much of the favorable saving effect of the individual
account plans comes from taking money off the table for other spending or
tax cuts, and that is why the saving impacts mostly increase as one moves
from the ﬁrst panel to the other two panels.
Extensions
We now explore our basic results more thoroughly and extend them in
several ways.
Beneﬁt Levels and Equity Investment
Tables 6 and 7 provide additional insight into the estimates in table 5 by
highlighting the benefit levels and role of equity investments, respectively,
for each reform proposal. Table 6 shows traditional Social Security bene-
fits, withdrawals from individual accounts, and total retirement benefits
(the sum of the first two columns) in 2070, all as percentages of baseline
GDP. The level of total retirement benefits is strikingly similar among
five of the seven proposals. Except for the plan that invests half the trust
fund in equities and the carve-out plan, all of the plans we examine keep
retirement beneﬁts in 2070 within 2 percent of the current-law level. Under
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beneﬁts is generally a good predictor of the saving effect of reform. Thus,
in the top panel of table 5, four of the five plans with similar benefit lev-
els also have similar effects on capital accumulation; the exception is the
pay-as-you-go tax increase, which boosts saving through high taxes.79
The composition of total beneﬁts is quite different among the ﬁve plans
with similar total benefits: some plans stay entirely with traditional bene-
ﬁts, whereas others replace those beneﬁts to a greater or lesser degree with
individual accounts. Benefit composition is very important for the eco-
nomic and political risk faced by beneﬁciaries, the level of administrative
costs, and the political durability of the plans; it is also important for the
saving effect of reform if the political process balances the unified bud-
get. Comparing table 6 with the middle panel of table 5 shows that plans
with higher individual account beneﬁts tend to increase capital accumula-
tion more than do other plans.
Table 7 examines the role of equity investments in the reform plans.
As explained earlier, our methodology tracks asset swaps among sectors,
and therefore shifts of Social Security or individual account balances into
equities have no direct effects on national saving. However, such invest-
ments do allow the public retirement system—the trust fund and individ-
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
79. The effects on capital accumulation are not necessarily identical for plans with
identical total benefits in 2070 because the plans may have different benefit paths during the
intervening years. Similarly, the carve-out plan accomplishes more saving than the plan that
invests half of the trust fund in equities, even though it has higher benefit levels in 2070,
because its beneﬁt cuts occur earlier.
Table 6. Retirement Beneﬁts in 2070 under Proposed Social Security Reforms
a
Percent of 2070 baseline GDP
Social Individual
Reform proposal Security accounts Total
No reform 6.8 0.0 6.8
Transfer surplus to trust fund 6.8 0.0 6.8
Invest half the trust fund in equities 6.1 0.0 6.1
Add-on individual accounts 4.7 2.1 6.8
Clawback 6.4 0.5 6.9
Carve-out 4.4 2.1 6.5
Carve-out with transfers 4.7 2.1 6.8
Payroll tax increase 6.8 0.0 6.8
Source: Authors’calculations.
a. Excludes capital taxation, household saving, and general-equilibrium effects.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9760-03  BPEA Elmendorf  12/21/2000 14:16  Page 43ual accounts (if any)—to finance given levels of benefits with a smaller
up-front commitment of resources. We measure the importance of equity
investments to each reform plan by calculating what would happen if equi-
ties earned only the bond rate of return. There are two basic effects: to
the extent the retirement system has defined benefits, a lower return on
equities reduces accumulated trust fund balances; to the extent the retire-
ment system has deﬁned contributions, a lower return on equities reduces
retirement consumption. Thus, as noted above, the composition of beneﬁts
has a critical effect on the risk faced by beneﬁciaries and the government.
The ﬁrst two columns of table 7 show total balances in the Social Secu-
rity trust fund and individual accounts in 2070 assuming that equities earn
their full expected return, and the next two columns show the same bal-
ances if equities earn only the expected return on bonds. The ﬁfth column
shows the difference in balances attributable to a higher equity return,
summing the trust fund and the individual accounts. This difference is zero
for the two plans that make no equity investments, but it is quite substan-
tial for the other five plans. The sixth column shows the extra retirement
consumption from individual accounts over the next seventy years that
arises from holding equities rather than bonds in these accounts.
80 This
amount is zero for the two plans that rely entirely on traditional Social
Security benefits; it is positive for the clawback plan, which pays small
benefits from individual accounts; and it is much larger for the plans that
rely more heavily on individual accounts. In the end, as the last column
of the table shows, the total reliance on equity returns of the five plans
that involve equities is roughly the same.
Time Paths of Capital Accumulation
Tables 5, 6, and 7 have shown the effect of reform in 2070, when bene-
fit cuts are fully phased in and almost all retirees have had individual
account contributions made on their behalf throughout their working lives.
But the impact of reforms at earlier dates is important as well, for two
reasons. First, incremental capital accumulation by 2040, say, gives us
the best sense of how each reform plan changes feasible consumption for
today’s young workers. Second, the Social Security system has not yet
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
80. The annual amounts are accumulated forward to 2070 at the interest rate on bonds
in the trust fund.
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will remain in place for such a long period is probably unrealistic. Thus the
short-run impact on capital accumulation may be as important a criterion
for evaluating reform plans as the long-run impact.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the capital stock corresponding to the
reform plans and political economy rules in table 5. It is clear that much of
the capital accumulation reported in table 5 occurs only after many years.
Still, many of the plans increase the capital stock by 20 percent of GDP
after two decades, which is a signiﬁcant effect. The time proﬁle of capital
accumulation under plans with the same amount of ultimate accumula-
tion is fairly similar. The main exception is the payroll tax increase, which
is not implemented until 2015 but has important effects on saving (under
two of the three political economy rules) in the very long run.
Asymmetric, Partial Response to the Uniﬁed Budget Balance
Our first three political economy rules assume either that there is no
pressure for budget balance or that this pressure immediately balances
the relevant budget concept (on a cyclically adjusted basis). It may be more
realistic to assume that only part of any incipient budget surplus or deﬁcit
is offset immediately by changes in spending or taxes. Moreover, the
response to surpluses may be quicker than the response to deﬁcits, because
tax cuts and spending increases are politically more palatable than tax
increases and spending cuts.
Table 8 reports the effect of Social Security reform on saving under a
political economy rule in which one-third of an incipient uniﬁed deﬁcit is
made up and two-thirds of an incipient uniﬁed surplus is dissipated.
81 The
ﬁrst column repeats the results from our uniﬁed budget rule in table 5; the
second column shows results under this alternative unified budget rule
with asymmetric, partial adjustment. The gradual and differential adjust-
ment to surpluses and deficits has the largest effect on capital accumula-
tion in the plans that invest half of the trust fund in equities, carve out
individual accounts, or increase the payroll tax.
Equity investments by the trust fund depress capital formation by much
less under this new political economy rule, for two reasons. First, although
the equity returns continue to provide additional budget dollars for on-
budget spending, the amount of this spending is muted by the partial
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 45
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Figure 2. Time Paths of Capital Accumulation under Alternative Political Economy
Rules, 2000–70a
Rule 1: No budget response
Rule 2: Balance the uniﬁed budget
(continued)
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Figure 2. Time Paths of Capital Accumulation under Alternative Political Economy
Rules, 2000–70a (continued)
Rule 3: Balance the on-budget account
Table 8. Effects of Proposed Social Security Reforms on Capital Accumulation in
2070 with Asymmetric, Partial Budget Adjustment
Percent of 2070 baseline GDP
Under




Reform proposal budget rule
a baseline baseline
Transfer surplus to trust fund 0 (110)
b 0 (97) 0 (76)
Invest half the trust fund 
in equities –207 –124 –62
Add-on individual accounts 111 108 82
Clawback 111 103 76
Carve-out 111 170 223
Carve-out with transfers 111 (188) 111 (163) 84 (125)
Payroll tax increase 0 77 141
Source: Authors’calculations.
a. From table 5.
b. Numbers in parentheses are calculated using a special budget scoring rule whereby transfers of the surplus reduce resources
available for other purposes.
Source: Authors’calculations.
a. Excludes capital taxation, household saving, and general-equilibrium effects.
9760-03  BPEA Elmendorf  12/21/2000 14:16  Page 47adjustment. Second, the beneﬁt cuts now have a modest positive effect on
capital accumulation, because they are not fully offset by additional
on-budget spending. Funding of individual accounts crowds out on-budget
spending, but this crowding out is less important to capital accumulation
under the partial adjustment rule because it takes longer for any surplus
to be eliminated. However, the cuts in traditional benefits that are part of
these plans now have a positive impact on capital accumulation (whereas
before they were ineffective), again because incipient surpluses are not
completely offset by new spending. For three of the four individual
account plans, these two effects roughly cancel. The exception is the
carve-out plan, where deep benefit cuts strengthen the second effect and
thereby boost capital accumulation substantially relative to the rule that
immediately balances the unified budget. Finally, the payroll tax increase
now has a substantial positive impact on saving, because the tax increases
are only partially dissipated by new spending.
Because this political economy rule involves an asymmetric budget
response, the amount of adjustment depends on whether the uniﬁed budget
is in surplus or in deficit. Therefore, in contrast to what happens under
our three main rules, changes in the baseline budget projection under this
rule will alter the estimated impact of a plan on capital accumulation. To
explore this effect, the third column of table 8 shows alternative estimates
for this policy rule based on a more pessimistic budget baseline. In this
scenario discretionary spending is held to a constant share of GDP, in
contrast to the OMB baseline in which discretionary spending remains
constant on an inflation-adjusted basis and therefore declines steadily as
a share of GDP. Uniﬁed budget deﬁcits emerge much more quickly in this
scenario than in the base case, so that the one-third adjustment to a deﬁcit
(instead of the two-thirds adjustment to a surplus) applies for a greater
share of the next seventy-five years. As a result, devoting on-budget
resources to Social Security induces an offsetting decline in spending of
only one-third rather than two-thirds, thereby reducing the impact on cap-
ital accumulation. In addition, plans that include benefit cuts are more
effective in raising capital accumulation than before, since only one-third
of the benefit cut is offset. Thus the two plans with transfers accomplish
less capital accumulation than under the regular budget baseline, but plans
with large benefit cuts or payroll tax increases (the plan that invests half
of the trust fund in equities, the carve-out plan, and the payroll tax
increase) lead to more incremental capital accumulation than before.
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Table 9 incorporates the three factors—the capital taxation, household
spending, and general-equilibrium responses—that were omitted from
the basic results. For comparison purposes, the first column repeats the
results from table 5 that showed additional capital accumulation in 2070
ignoring these responses. 
The second column of the table adds the tax responses, which matter
in two ways. First, our earlier calculations understated the return to sav-
ing by omitting corporate tax revenue. In the first panel of the table, in
which political economy rule 1 is assumed, we see that incorporating this
revenue increases incremental capital accumulation under each reform
plan by about 20 percent. This first channel does not operate under the
other two full-adjustment political economy rules, because those rules
imply that additional spending dissipates any additional on-budget tax
revenue. 
Second, the personal income tax on capital income shifts part of the
return to capital from households to the government. Under the ﬁrst polit-
ical economy rule, this shift has no effect on national saving because the
income is saved in either sector. Under the second and third rules, however,
the part of the capital return that is shifted to the government is dissi-
pated, whereas the part that remains with households is saved. Because
alternative reform plans leave households with portfolios of different com-
positions and therefore different capital tax burdens, the share of the
capital return that is shifted to the government differs across plans. For
example, investing half of the trust fund in equities increases household
bond holdings relative to equity holdings; because bonds generate less
tax revenue than do equities, this portfolio shift reduces personal income
tax payments and boosts saving. Conversely, in reform plans that cause
households to pay higher capital income taxes, this channel reduces capi-
tal accumulation. In both directions, however, the effects tend to be mod-
est, typically resulting in changes of less than 10 percent. 
The third column of table 9 incorporates household saving responses.
Recall that we assume that household saving falls in response to funding
of individual accounts, rises in response to cuts in traditional Social Secu-
rity benefits, and falls when the budget surplus increases. Many reform
plans would fund individual accounts while cutting traditional beneﬁts; if
such a switch left expected total retirement beneﬁts unchanged, household
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 49












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9760-03  BPEA Elmendorf  12/21/2000 14:16  Page 50saving would fall slightly because we assume that individuals respond
more to the funding of individual accounts than to benefit cuts. We begin
in the middle panel, where the balanced uniﬁed budget rule neutralizes any
effect of the budget balance on household saving. For the three basic indi-
vidual account plans, the household saving response reduces capital accu-
mulation a little. For the two plans with transfers to the Social Security
trust fund, the special scoring rule would allow a unified budget surplus
to be sustained, and households would respond to this surplus by reduc-
ing their saving, thus reducing total capital accumulation relative to the
previous column. The large relative increase in capital accumulation (rel-
ative to the previous column) in the plan that invests half of the trust fund
in equities occurs because households increase their saving in response to
the benefit cut, and this is not offset by income from individual accounts.
The third panel of the table shows that household saving effects reduce
capital accumulation more when the political process balances the on-
budget account rather than the unified budget. This occurs because bal-
ancing the on-budget account often generates unified surpluses that
depress household saving.
The last column of table 9 adds general-equilibrium changes in the
returns to capital and labor. The primary effect of these changes is to
reduce the rate at which saving compounds in plans that increase capital
accumulation and to increase the rate at which dissaving compounds in
plans that decrease capital accumulation. This causes positive effects on
capital accumulation to shrink substantially toward zero, with the degree
of shrinkage determined by both the amount of accumulation and its tim-
ing. At the same time, negative effects on capital accumulation are now
stronger than in the absence of general-equilibrium effects.
82
Conclusion
The central lesson of this paper is that the effect of Social Security
reform on national saving depends critically on the political economy of
budget policy. If taxes and spending are adjusted to bring some measure of
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82. We do not model additional household saving responses that might occur in response
to changes in rates of return. If we did model such responses, both the positive and nega-
tive capital accumulation estimates would shrink toward zero.
9760-03  BPEA Elmendorf  12/21/2000 14:16  Page 51the budget into balance, any reform must set aside resources outside of that
budget measure in order to achieve additional saving. Specifically, if the
political process tends to balance the budget excluding Social Security,
then saving is increased by plans that shift on-budget resources to either
the Social Security trust fund or individual accounts, and by plans that
cut Social Security beneﬁts or increase payroll taxes. However, if the polit-
ical process tends to balance the uniﬁed budget, then saving is increased by
plans that shift resources to individual accounts, but not by plans that
shift resources within the government or by proposals that change Social
Security beneﬁts or taxes.
The broader point is that budget accounting conventions help to frame
decisions about spending and taxes—and that such framing matters cru-
cially for the impact of Social Security reform on saving. It bears empha-
sizing that devoting additional resources to non–Social Security spending
or tax cuts may be an appropriate goal of Social Security reform, but that
goal conﬂicts to some extent with the often-stated goal of raising national
saving to prepare for the aging of the population.
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Discussion
Matthew D. Shapiro: This ambitious paper has three major components.
First, the authors model different proposals for changing Social Security
within a single, unified framework. Second, they consider the effects of
these changes under alternative “rules” for what happens in the rest of the
budget. Third, they attempt to model the general-equilibrium response of
the economy to these policy changes. Given the current focus of politi-
cians, policymakers, and the public on both Social Security and the fiscal
position of the government, this paper is very timely. Even putting aside
the main theme of the paper—the role of the policy rules—the authors
have done a service by comparing model reform proposals within a sin-
gle framework. They also do a good job of clearing up some confusion
over actual reform proposals by focusing on which aspects add to national
saving and which do not.
To carry out this analysis, the authors need to make many assumptions.
The outcome depends on the behavior of ﬁrms, households, and foreigners
as well as on the policy rules that the government follows. Although it is
not the focus of the analysis, the authors need to specify the behavior of
private agents. The modeling perspective taken for these agents is similar
to that for the government: the authors reduce their behavior to a set of
parameters that express behavioral rules. For the government these param-
eters take on the value of zero or one; for example, the government saves
all or none of the primary surplus. The rules for consumers are similarly
cast, although the parameter values are not limited to zero or one. For
example, consumers are assumed to treat some fraction of Social Secu-
rity assets as net wealth. In departing from the frictionless, dynamic opti-
mization framework, the authors have given themselves infinite degrees of
53
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parameterization of these behavioral rules. Careful readers of this paper
will be well aware that the behavioral rules might not be invariant to
changes in policy rules. Moreover, the outcome of the analysis will depend
on the choice of the behavioral parameters, given the rules. That said, my
impression is that the authors have chosen reasonable parameter values.
They have also explored how the choice of key parameters affects the
analysis. Later I will suggest how this exploration could be made more
systematic.
The authors analyze four alternative rules for the interaction of Social
Security reforms with the rest of the federal budget: 
—that there is no interaction, 
—that the on-budget account is balanced, 
—that the uniﬁed budget is balanced, or
—that the budget process tends toward on-budget balance but does so
only partially in a given period and asymmetrically. 
I think it is better to call these four possibilities “scenarios” rather than
“rules.” Although the mechanical playing out of accounting rules does
have analogues in ﬁscal policy, for example in the various balanced-budget
rules of state governments, it is not obvious that they are as helpful for
understanding the federal government’s behavior. Since the federal rules of
the game are essentially period-by-period choices of the policy process, it
may not be useful to think of one accounting concept or another as writ-
ten in stone. 
The appeal of the paper’s scenario-based analysis depends on its time
horizon. Over a medium-run horizon, this framing of the debate is likely to
be important. Consider how the terms of the debate during the 2000 pres-
idential election would have been different had Social Security been off-
budget. I have no doubt that having Social Security off-budget would have
constrained the candidates in their various proposals for taxes, spending,
and Social Security. The authors’ simulations make this point systemati-
cally and convincingly.
Most of their results, however, focus on the very long run. Here I am
more skeptical. Over the long run, government behavior will adjust in
ways that make static budgetary rules less relevant. For this kind of analy-
sis I would suggest a model of government that more closely mimics that
of the consumer. A natural benchmark is to suppose that the government
solves a dynamic optimization problem subject to a present-value budget
54 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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with the consumer’s problem. How much foresight does the government
show? Over what horizon does it smooth tax rates? These government
behaviors parallel the degree of liquidity constraint or myopia on the part
of consumers. Does expenditure react endogenously to shocks to taxes?
This government behavior perhaps parallels the endogeneity of the labor
supply of consumers. Does the government have different propensities to
spend from different pools of resources (in this case the on- and off-budget
accounts)? This government behavior parallels the “mental accounting”
sometimes ascribed to consumers. It is not obvious that constant under-
lying behavior along these lines leads to constant behavior with respect to
the rules articulated in the paper. For example, a myopic government will
respond asymmetrically to shocks. Behavior that considers mental
accounting might depend on the balance in the account in addition to any
shock to it. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to specify full models of
consumer and government behavior, it is worth considering them for sev-
eral reasons. First, it places some discipline on specifying the behavioral
rules for both the government and private agents. Second, the behavior of
the government is likely to correlate with that of the private sector. Con-
sider a private sector populated by agents who lack foresight or who have
mental accounts that alter their propensity to consume from different pools
of funds. Such a private sector would seems less likely to elect a govern-
ment or support institutions that optimize with respect to a present-value
budget constraint than would a private sector populated by faultless opti-
mizers. Constitutional provisions (such as state balanced-budget require-
ments or checks and balances at the federal level) are efforts to enforce a
longer view on a political process and a public that tend toward short-
sightedness. In any case, if a correlation between government behavior and
individual behavior can be established, it would limit the range of cases the
authors need to consider.
The authors provide little guidance on how to interpret the policy rules
they consider. Are they a menu of choices for policymakers? Can these
choices be made binding, especially for future policymakers? Or will the
choice of rule (or its enforcement) shift as political and economic circum-
stances change? 
The historical behavior of budget rules provides evidence on these
questions. The federal experience has been mixed. The Gramm-Rudman
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the tight ceilings on federal discretionary spending during the Clinton
administration played a role in getting the federal budget into balance in
the 1990s. Yet as the fall 2000 legislative session makes clear, this fiscal
discipline may be short-lived once budget surpluses materialize. As
already noted, the tax and spending proposals of the presidential candi-
dates this year were clearly wedded to budget accountancy. If Social Secu-
rity were off budget, their proposals might have been different. It is less
obvious, however, that the interaction of budget accountancy and politi-
cal rhetoric that we saw in the campaign will have a substantial impact on
policy outcomes.
Evidence across countries, across states, and across time within the
United States provides some guidance about which of the authors’policy
scenarios is the most likely. In an earlier issue of the Brookings Papers,
Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti, and José Tavares have reported cross-
country evidence on ﬁscal adjustments.
1 Although their concern was with
curing a deficit rather than disposing of a surplus, perhaps the questions
are not totally asymmetric. Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares found that most
adjustments fail, but certain political conditions improve the prospects
for success somewhat. Interestingly, they found that the right and the left
are equally unsuccessful at achieving fiscal consolidation. They did find,
however, that the form of the adjustment matters: for example, it is easier
to raise indirect taxes than to cut expenditure. Although this is not sur-
prising, it does support the present authors’ message that we need to con-
sider where in the budget changes will be made.
The evidence on state budget rules is perhaps more relevant, but mixed.
Budget rules do matter, but they are not strictly enforced. James Poterba
found that, even in states with strict balanced-budget rules, budgetary
shocks are not fully offset by expenditure or tax adjustments.
2 Hence, the
zero-one parameterization of the ﬁrst three rules in the present paper is not
realistic. The fourth, partial adjustment rule is a major step in the direc-
tion of realism.
What has happened in the United States in the past? Does revenue burn
a hole in the government’s pocket, or can a long-run policy to save bud-
get surpluses be put in place? Alan Auerbach found that about half of any
56 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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3 Hence the gov-
ernment appears to be something in between a permanent-income agent
and a spendthrift. This evidence paints a picture similar to Poterba’s cross-
state evidence and again points toward the relevance of the present
authors’partial adjustment rule.
A ﬁnal issue is that of uncertainty. Two major types of uncertainty bear
on the paper: uncertainty about parameters and uncertainty about shocks.
The paper gives a flavor of the range of possible outcomes by presenting
results for the four policy rules. What it does not do is assess which rule
is more likely to prevail or, more realistically, what is the probability of a
transition from one rule to another.
The current ﬁscal situation highlights the importance of this uncertainty
in at least two ways. First, the political consensus in the second half of
the 1990s shifted to favor budget balance. This process began with the
Clinton administration’s emphasis on ﬁscal consolidation in 1993 and con-
tinued throughout the decade. Second, U.S. economic performance has
been unexpectedly strong. Both the political and the economic events of
the 1990s had unexpected, favorable consequences for the federal sur-
plus. It is easy to imagine scenarios that would reverse them. The paper
leaves open how different budget rules would be expected to perform in
response to shocks to the economy. It also leaves open the question of
shocks to the rules themselves.
There is also substantial uncertainty about the behavioral parameters
underlying the simulations. These include households’ marginal propen-
sity to consume from private wealth, the degree to which households inte-
grate Social Security wealth with private wealth, and the degree to which
increments to national saving are absorbed abroad. Certain demographic
parameters that bear on Social Security are subject to uncertainty as well.
Plausible variation in birth, death, migration, and fertility rates can have an
enormous impact.
4
Finally, the paper neglects the uncertainty of returns in the stock mar-
ket. The expected return is highly variable, and this uncertainty cumu-
lates over time; it does not average out. By neglecting this fact, and treat-
ing the average return on equities as fixed, some proponents of private
investment of Social Security taxes have done a serious disservice to the
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 57
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invocation of the law of large numbers, because in their analysis assets
are reshufﬂed rather than invested incrementally. Nonetheless, their failure
to explicitly account for uncertainty is a lost opportunity to bring greater
clarity to this issue.
In short, there is substantial uncertainty about almost every aspect of
this paper: the budget rules, private behavior, demographics, aggregate
economic performance, and asset returns. Let me suggest a framework
for summarizing this uncertainty. The authors could specify probability
distributions for the key parameters. They could then simulate their model
for different values of the parameters. Finally, they could tabulate 
probability-weighted results from the simulation. Similarly, they could
provide confidence intervals for the predictions of their model. None of
this would add substantially to the complexity of the paper’s calculations.
But it would provide a useful summary of the implications of the model
and an assessment of the uncertainty surrounding its predictions.
Stephen P. Zeldes: Understanding the effects of Social Security reform on
national saving is important, because national saving is the primary way in
which current generations increase the resources available in the future.
This paper by Douglas Elmendorf and Jeffrey Liebman makes signiﬁcant
strides toward improving our understanding of the interactions between
political economy rules and Social Security reforms. One can tell from
reading the paper that both authors have hands-on experience with shaping
government policy. Rather than content themselves with a long list of the
possible effects of various policies, they work hard to derive concrete and
sensible estimates of the magnitude of each effect. These estimates make
the paper much more valuable.
The authors start with a careful documentation of the shift from big fed-
eral budget deﬁcits to big surpluses. This is an excellent summary of recent
budget history, although I am not sure how relevant it is to the rest of the
paper. The paper then breaks down national saving into government saving
(equal to the on-budget surplus plus Social Security saving) and private
saving (equal to saving in individual retirement saving accounts plus other
household saving) and looks at the reactions of each of these components
to various possible Social Security reforms. Each of these reactions is
important, but the one that is the least studied, and the one on which the
paper sheds the most light, is the government saving response.
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Social Security reforms along three key dimensions: creating individual
(defined-contribution) accounts, prefunding Social Security, and diversi-
fying Social Security funds, in particular by investing in equities.
1 GMZ
argue that these dimensions are completely separate from each other. We
could create or refrain from creating individual accounts, with or without
prefunding, and do either or both of these, or neither, with or without
diversiﬁcation. Because any of these combinations is feasible, the decision
to move along any one dimension is in principle separable from the deci-
sion to move along any other. Although both the creation of individual
accounts and diversification can influence national saving, they do so in
subtle ways. The dimension that most directly inﬂuences national saving is
prefunding: increasing prefunding will in general increase national saving. 
GMZ ignored the reactions of government spending and taxes to Social
Security reform proposals. In practice, however, the political economy
issues that Elmendorf and Liebman examine may be very important and
may create linkages among the three dimensions described by GMZ. For
example, many proponents of individual accounts believe it would be dif-
ﬁcult politically to build up a large Social Security trust fund, because such
a buildup would induce Congress to increase on-budget spending, lower
income taxes, raise Social Security benefits, or cut Social Security taxes.
Any of these responses would offset the increase in national saving. This
suggests that in order for prefunding to raise national saving, it must be
done through the creation or expansion of individual accounts. Elmen-
dorf and Liebman help us understand these arguments based on political
economy.
The paper proposes and examines four rules characterizing the response
of the on-budget balance to changes in the Social Security surplus. Under
the ﬁrst rule there is no pressure to balance the budget. When Social Secu-
rity changes, Congress does not alter either taxes or spending. Under the
second rule either on-budget spending or taxes respond to fully offset
changes in the Social Security surplus, keeping the uniﬁed budget surplus
at zero. Under the third rule the Social Security surplus is ignored, and
instead the on-budget surplus adjusts to zero. Under the fourth rule the
unified budget is balanced, as under the second rule, but surpluses are
eliminated faster than deﬁcits. 
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 59
1. Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998).
9760-03  BPEA Elmendorf  12/21/2000 14:16  Page 59For each political economy rule the paper carefully and systematically
examines the effects of a variety of different Social Security reform plans
on national saving. To explain what is underlying some of their results, I
will focus on just two of these reform plans in somewhat simpliﬁed form.
The ﬁrst plan transfers general revenue (in practice about $3 trillion, which
I normalize to 100) to Social Security. Elmendorf and Liebman call this
the “transfer surplus to trust fund” plan, but because it captures the essence
of reform proposals by Vice President Al Gore, I will refer to it simply as
plan G. The second plan I will consider transfers money (again 100 units)
from general revenue into newly created individual accounts and cuts
future Social Security benefits by 100 (in present value). The paper calls
this the “carve-out with transfers” plan, but because it is consistent with
ideas proposed by Texas governor George W. Bush, I label it plan B. In this
simple setup, plans B and G are similar in that they both rely on general
revenue transfers, but plan G transfers the money into the trust fund,
whereas plan B transfers it into individual accounts. To keep things simple,
let us ignore all the individual and general-equilibrium responses and some
of the more subtle features of the model and focus on the political
responses—the paper’s most important contribution. 
Table 1 below describes how each of these two plans would affect gov-
ernment and national saving under each of the authors’ first three budget
rules. For each rule, the rows list the various saving measures—the on-
budget surplus, Social Security saving, the unified budget surplus, indi-
vidual account saving, and national saving—plus the unfunded liability
of Social Security. This unfunded liability is the present value of all the
promised future beneﬁts that have accrued to date minus the current value
of the trust fund. The unfunded liability of the current system has been
estimated at about $9 trillion.
Consider the first set of rows, the no-adjustment rule (rule 1). Plan G
would cause the on-budget surplus to fall by 100 and the Social Security
surplus to rise by 100. There is no change in the unified surplus, because
money is simply being shifted from one pot to another, and similarly there
is no effect on national saving. Since 100 has been transferred into the trust
fund, the unfunded liability goes down by 100. Under plan B the on-
budget surplus falls by 100. There is no change in the Social Security sur-
plus, but individual account saving rises by 100. The uniﬁed surplus, there-
fore, goes down by 100. 
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column), we see that under plan B the uniﬁed surplus is smaller, and indi-
vidual account saving greater, than under plan G. National saving is
unchanged under both plans, and the unfunded liability falls by the same
amount in both plans. In other words, under this political economy rule,
the two plans have identical effects on national saving and on the unfunded
liability, and the only difference is that plan G generates a Social Security
surplus and plan B an individual account surplus of the same magnitude.
The difference boils down to who holds the extra funds, individuals or
the trust fund.
Things get a little more interesting when we move to the political econ-
omy rule that balances the unified budget (rule 2). The results for plan G
are the same as under budget rule 1: since there was no change in the uni-
Douglas W. Elmendorf and Jeffrey B. Liebman 61
Table 1. Effects of Alternative Social Security Reforms on Saving under Three 
Political Economy Rules
Change from baseline
Item G B B – G
Rule 1: No adjustment
On-budget surplus –100 –100 0
Social Security surplus 100 0 –100
Uniﬁed budget surplus 0 –100 –100
Individual account saving 0 100 100
National saving 0 0 0
Unfunded Social Security liability –100 –100 0
Rule 2: Balance uniﬁed budget
On-budget surplus –100 0 100
Social Security surplus 100 0 –100
Uniﬁed budget surplus 0 0 0
Individual account saving 0 100 100
National saving 0 100 100
Unfunded Social Security liability –100 –100 0
Rule 3: Balance on-budget account
On-budget surplus 0 0 0
Social Security surplus 100 0 –100
Uniﬁed budget surplus 100 0 –100
Individual account saving 0 100 100
National saving 100 100 0
Unfunded Social Security liability –100 –100 0
9760-03  BPEA Elmendorf  12/21/2000 14:16  Page 61ﬁed budget surplus in the ﬁrst row, no adjustment is necessary. But under
plan B the government was going to end up with a larger deficit or a
smaller surplus than it otherwise would have. This means that Congress
has to cut spending or raise taxes, bringing the uniﬁed budget surplus back
to zero. As a result, plan B ends up with greater national saving, because
it makes the measured unified surplus smaller, which causes a political
reaction—Congress cuts spending or raises taxes—which in turn raises
national saving. The unfunded liability of Social Security is identical under
the two plans.
Under the political economy rule that balances the on-budget surplus
(rule 3), both plans induce Congress to take action, because both cause a
larger on-budget deficit or a smaller surplus. The same adjustment has to
occur under both plans, so that the effects on national saving are identical. 
Looking across all three sets of rows, we see that only under political
economy rule 2 do the plans affect national saving differently. Again, this
happens because, under this rule, plan B removes money from the uniﬁed
budget surplus, which restrains Congress from cutting taxes or raising
spending. 
Two proposals have been made that would eliminate even this differ-
ence between plans B and G under rule 2. The first is to create a special,
rather unusual scoring procedure for general revenue transfers that says
that transferring 100 from general revenues into Social Security has a
negative effect (−100) on the unified budget surplus. Under this scoring
procedure the unified surplus would change by the same amount under G
as under B, so Congress would react to the two plans in the same way.
The second proposal is to alter plan G to include the purchase of 100 of
equities by the trust fund and score this as an outlay. The effects of the
modiﬁed plan G on congressional action and on national saving would be
identical to those of B.
Let me next provide some comments on the paper’s results and sug-
gest some directions for future research. First, although the paper empha-
sizes the effects of Social Security reform on national saving, we need to
remember that there are obviously other important criteria on which any
reform should be judged. In fact, many reforms would cause national sav-
ing and consumer well-being to change in opposite directions, because
households that are made better off by reform tend to increase their current
spending, thus lowering national saving. In other words, many reforms that
improve welfare actually end up lowering national saving.
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Surpluses,” is a bit misleading. This part of the title suggests, as does the
ﬁrst section of the paper, that the analysis is different under a baseline fore-
cast of budget surpluses than it would be with a balanced budget or with
projected deficits. Yet in most of the paper the authors examine symmet-
ric rules, that is, rules that are independent of the level of the surplus. The
fourth, asymmetric political economy rule is an important step in the right
direction.
Third, future work in this area should improve the treatment of risk.
This paper considers only expected present values, with no risk adjust-
ment. Many other investigators, including the actuaries at the Social Secu-
rity Administration, have followed the same approach, but it is one that I
find problematic and that can give answers that are misleading and likely
to be misinterpreted.
2 The most important example of this relates to the
treatment of the return on equities. The authors assume that the mean
equity return is about 4 percentage points higher than the bond return, but
they ignore the uncertainty of the equity return. This makes it difficult to
interpret the results of plans that involve equity investments, either by the
Social Security trust fund or through individual accounts. Adjusting for
risk is not easy. One possible adjustment is to assume that the equity
premium is exactly the compensation for risk, and therefore assume that
the risk-adjusted stock and bond returns are identical. Although this is
not completely satisfactory either, results based on this assumption (pro-
vided in the authors’table 7) do provide a useful alternative benchmark. 
Fourth, I would like to suggest using the existing empirical evidence
and conducting further empirical work to ascertain the political economy
rule that best characterizes Congress. Such a response function would no
doubt be more complicated than the simple rules presented in the paper.
3
In particular, because the government likely responds not just to the cur-
rent surplus but to accumulated past deﬁcits and surpluses as well, the list
of possible spending rules should be expanded to include rules based on
the level of the debt. Henning Bohn, for example, examined how the U.S. pri-
mary surplus responds to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio and found that,
after adjusting for war and cyclical factors, the surplus tends to respond posi-
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4 That is, when the debt is large, Congress starts running
a bigger surplus. That same methodology could be applied to examine how
spending and taxes respond to the on-budget and the off-budget surpluses,
as well as the on-budget and the off-budget (implicit) debt.
Finally, the paper might be a useful starting point for further work on
the political risk inherent in Social Security. The paper points out that no
consensus exists as to how current and future Congresses are likely to react
to changes in the on-budget and the off-budget surpluses, and that this
makes it difficult to forecast the effects on national saving. Nor is there
agreement as to how future Social Security program rules governing con-
tributions and beneﬁts might be changed in response to large future imbal-
ances in the system. In states of the world in which economic growth or
mortality or other economic or demographic variables turn out to be dif-
ferent than forecast, Social Security might not be able to pay out promised
benefits under current tax rates. Since the system does not have built-in
adjustments for these contingencies, commissions get formed, politicians
debate, the public discusses, and ultimately the rules are changed. But how
Congress will ultimately change the rules is not predictable, and this intro-
duces political risk into the system. As a first step toward designing a
system with additional self-correcting features, it would be useful to exam-
ine how Congress has historically changed Social Security rules in
response to surpluses or deﬁcits within the Social Security system.
General discussion: Many panelists supported the view that political econ-
omy considerations are important in evaluating different Social Security
proposals but expressed reservations about the authors’particular assump-
tions. For Gregory Mankiw the paper clarified how crucial one’s view of
political forces is for predicting the long-run consequences of proposals to
reform Social Security. But he was skeptical that any particular accounting
convention or arrangement—off-budget, on-budget, lockbox provisions—
would endure over horizons as long as those considered by the authors. In
Mankiw’s view these concepts come and go with the political wind and eco-
nomic circumstances. He suggested basing the analysis on deeper funda-
mentals, for example, assuming that political economic outcomes are deter-
mined by the median voter’s preferences, with accounting conventions and
other transitory features of the budgetary process following those preferences. 
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more sophisticated political economy behavior than the authors consid-
ered. He believed the shift in the discussion from the “unified” budget to
the “on” budget was not a random event, but rather reflected the fact that
the aging population of baby-boomers is becoming an increasingly large
fraction of the electorate. Sims believed that older people, who are known
to be politically active, are well aware of the risk to the retirement system
and they probably have little budgetary or accounting illusion. Their
importance in the electorate and their intense interest in Social Security
may be the primary reason why political discussions of Social Security
have become more forward looking and why interest has grown in bud-
getary conventions that seem to protect the system. But the electorate
ﬁfty years down the road, when the baby-boomers have passed through the
system, may have quite a different composition and quite different bud-
getary objectives. Sims concluded that how Social Security issues are
framed in terms of budget accounting may be important, but only for much
shorter horizons, such as the four-year election cycle, rather than the very
long horizons considered by the authors. 
In the same vein, David Wilcox worried about what will happen in the
next recession when the pain involved in maintaining balance in the on-
budget account might shift attention back to the uniﬁed surplus. This might
be avoided if the discussion were shifted to a cyclically adjusted budget,
but he wondered whether the complexity of that concept might be too great
for it to survive in the political arena. James Duesenberry concurred with
the view that the paper took too long a perspective. He suggested it would
be useful for the authors to run the model over shorter time horizons,
placing greater emphasis on the consequences of various policies over
the next ten to twenty years.
Wilcox and William Gale agreed with the authors’ view that the way
budgetary issues are framed can have enormous effects on budgetary out-
comes. Wilcox noted that moving the focus of the political conversation
from the uniﬁed balance to the on-budget balance had changed the politi-
cal debate from how to dispose of approximately $4.2 trillion to how to
dispose of approximately $2 trillion. Gale added that the same principles
that argue for taking Social Security off budget suggest that Medicare
and government pensions should be off budget too. Taking these expendi-
tures off budget would reduce the $2 trillion on-budget surplus by another
$800 billion.
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illustration of that point, he underscored how important it is for a politician
to be able to declare his or her support for balancing something. For exam-
ple, a politician would have found it much more politically salient, in the
fiscal year just ended, to support the two-part goal of balancing the on-
budget account and putting Social Security into long-term balance rather
than the two-part goal of running a $230 billion uniﬁed surplus and putting
Social Security in long-term balance.
Gale observed that the experience of most countries that have engaged
in reform of their retirement systems tends to confirm the importance of
political economy considerations. In contrast to the standard economic
model, which predicts that such reforms would result in higher national
saving, workers typically have received tax cuts, and national saving has,
if anything, diminished.
Robert Hall thought the paper and the discussion overemphasized the
effect of Social Security reform on saving; these were effects that he
thought the economics profession knew little about. He thought there
should be greater attention to ﬁnding what method of operating the Social
Security system yields the best path of individual benefits. He observed
that Social Security as it is currently run is extraordinarily efﬁcient. Mutual
funds that people buy as individuals have operating costs that are typically
twenty times as high. Employer-operated plans are similar: typically the
employer pays a fee to the operator of the plan, and then each employee
pays a signiﬁcant management fee. Hall predicted that moving to individ-
ual accounts would involve a very substantial loss of efficiency, a predic-
tion consistent with the experience of many countries that have privatized
their retirement systems. Sims agreed that the focus on the effect of
reforms on saving was too limited. He noted that an important literature,
including the paper by George Hall and Stefan Krieger in this volume,
argues that the central issue is how reforms affect the time path of taxes. In
this analysis the essential feature of prefunding retirement programs is that
it smooths distorting tax rates over time, whether or not it affects national
saving. Mankiw emphasized the political risk that he believed was intrin-
sic in public systems. Some proposals for individual accounts, for exam-
ple, are subject to the risk of clawbacks, which could be changed with the
political climate. This led him to prefer individual accounts that are indi-
vidually funded and vested.
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